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SUBNATIONAL DIGITAL SERVICES TAXATION
ANDREW APPLEBY*
Existing tax regimes fail to tax digital services appropriately. Digital
services based on extracting and monetizing user data—most notably digital
advertising—are particularly problematic because tax regimes do not
adequately account for the enormous value derived from user data.
Internationally, taxing jurisdictions have recognized these failures and
commenced a controversial push toward new digital services taxes, or DSTs.
Subnational taxing jurisdictions in the United States face the same issues and
are searching for solutions.
This Article begins by examining the motivations and justifications for
digital service taxation at both the international and subnational levels.
These justifications center on antiquated tax regimes that do not sufficiently
capture profit from new business models, particularly business models that
rely on valuable data extracted from users in the taxing jurisdiction.
Next, this Article presents options for subnational digital service
taxation. These options range from slightly modified existing tax regimes to
novel approaches that may more appropriately tax digital services,
specifically those services that extract and monetize user data. This Article
also analyzes the constitutional, federal preemption, and sourcing challenges
facing subnational digital services taxes.
This Article concludes by examining how subnational taxing
jurisdictions may most effectively tax digital services. Although states have
started to embrace digital advertising taxes modeled after European digital
services taxes, these taxes are narrow and susceptible to challenge.
Subnational jurisdictions have several better options, including publicly
traded stock-based taxes and data mining taxes.
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INTRODUCTION
Existing tax regimes fail to tax digital services appropriately. Digital
services based on extracting and monetizing user data—most notably digital
advertising—are particularly problematic because tax regimes do not
adequately account for the enormous value derived from user data. The
amorphous, cross-border nature of the digital economy makes adequate
taxation even more difficult because there is often no clear answer as to which
jurisdiction may impose tax and to what extent. Internationally, taxing
jurisdictions have recognized these failures and commenced a controversial
push toward new digital services taxes, or DSTs. Subnational taxing
jurisdictions in the United States face the same issues and are searching for
solutions.
The justifications for a new tax regime center on existing antiquated tax
regimes that do not sufficiently capture profit from new business models,
particularly business models that rely on valuable data extracted from users
in the taxing jurisdiction.1 In contrast to a traditional two-party transaction
1. See Wei Cui, The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense, 73 TAX L. REV. 69, 71–73
(2019); Adam B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94 DENV.
L. REV. 145, 146–48 (2016); Omri Marian, Taxing Data, 47 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 21, 35), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793892; Billy
Hamilton, Will ‘Techlash’ Open the Door to State Taxes on Big Data?, 100 TAX NOTES STATE
1427, 1427–30 (2021).
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in which a vendor provides a service to a consumer and the consumer pays
the vendor a market price, the prevailing digital service business model
reflects at least a three-party transaction.2 A digital service provider provides
a service to an end user, but instead of charging that end user a market price
for the service, the digital service provider charges nothing or a much lower
subsidized price. The digital service provider extracts the end user’s personal
data and uses that valuable resource to sell targeted advertising, which the
provider embeds in its services to end users. In this business model, digital
service providers are monetizing user data and jurisdictions are struggling to
adequately tax the value inuring to the digital service provider.3
These large technology companies experienced massive revenue growth
during 2020 while many businesses were suffering or shuttering due to the
global pandemic, greatly intensifying legislative pressure to tax these
companies more appropriately.4 The Big Five tech companies—Alphabet
(“Google”), Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft—were the largest five
companies in the United States based on market value in 2020.5 These
companies are also exceedingly profitable, with Google, Microsoft, and
Apple among the top five most profitable companies in the United States in
2020.6 Arguably, a portion of any excess profit is attributable to value in
these companies’ business models that is not adequately taxed.
There have also been calls to use tax regimes, rather than antitrust or
other regulatory means, to mitigate the monopolistic nature of large
multinational technology companies such as Google and Facebook,
particularly as privacy and platform censorship become greater concerns.7
2. See Cui, supra note 1, at 85; Thimmesch, supra note 1, at 150–51; Marian, supra note 1
(manuscript at 29–30); Hamilton, supra note 1.
3. See Cui, supra note 1, at 85; Thimmesch, supra note 1, at 150–51; Marian, supra note 1
(manuscript at 29–30); Hamilton, supra note 1, at 1427–31.
4. See, e.g., Ruth Mason & Darien Shanske, INSIGHT: The Time Has Come for State Digital
Taxes, BLOOMBERG TAX (May 29, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-taxreport/insight-the-time-has-come-for-state-digital-taxes-55; Cameron Faulkner, Amazon’s Latest
Earnings Cap Off a Sterling 2020, Despite the Pandemic, VERGE (Feb. 2, 2021, 5:10 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/2/22260133/amazon-q4-2020-quarterly-earnings-jeff-bezosceo-transition-andy-jassy; Jordan Novet & Jennifer Elias, Alphabet Revenue Up 23% as Core
Advertising Business Shows Strong Growth, CNBC (Feb. 2, 2021, 3:31 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/02/alphabet-googl-earnings-q4-2020.html;
Press
Release,
Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2020 Results (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2021/Facebook-Reports-FourthQuarter-and-Full-Year-2020-Results/default.aspx.
5. Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/fortune500/2020/search (last visited May 19,
2021).
6. Id.
7. Paul Romer, A Tax That Could Fix Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/opinion/tax-facebook-google.html; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah &
Lior Frank, Antitrust and the Corporate Tax: Why We Need Progressive Corporate Tax Rates, 167
TAX NOTES FED. 1199, 1201 (2020); Stewart Baker, How to Rein in Big Tech? Tax the Behemoths.,
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Implementing a new tax regime instead of a new regulatory regime may be a
more feasible approach, especially at the state and local level.
Jurisdictions need to consider their approaches carefully, as there are
myriad constitutional, federal preemption, and administrative obstacles they
must navigate to create a viable digital services tax. Many jurisdictions do
not fully understand these novel business models, which supports the
assertion that current tax regimes do not adequately tax data-focused
industries, but also cautions against a hasty response. Jurisdictions should
embrace a diligent and deliberate approach because these tax regimes have
the potential to alter the entire economy.
This Article begins by examining the motivations and justifications for
digital service taxation at both the international and subnational levels.8 This
Article then presents options for subnational digital services taxation.9 These
options range from slightly modified existing tax regimes to novel
approaches that may more appropriately tax digital services, specifically
those services that extract and monetize user data. Next, this Article analyzes
the constitutional, federal preemption,10 and sourcing challenges11 facing
subnational digital services taxes. This Article concludes by examining how
subnational taxing jurisdictions may most effectively tax digital services.
I. THE RISE OF DIGITAL SERVICES TAXES
Digital services taxes are leading the international tax and political
discussions. They are most prevalent in Europe, but countries worldwide are
adopting or proposing new digital services taxes.12 Although there are
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
19,
2021,
9:15
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/01/19/rein-in-big-tech-taxes/; Paul Mozur et al., A
Global Tipping Point for Reining in Tech Has Arrived, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/technology/global-tipping-point-tech.html.
Rather than
imposing a new tax on large technology companies, and in response to social media “deplatforming,” Florida enacted legislation that precludes any businesses that violate antitrust laws
from receiving tax incentives. S.B. 7072, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See, e.g., Elke Asen, What European OECD Countries Are Doing About Digital Services
Taxes, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 25, 2021), https://taxfoundation.org/digital-tax-europe-2020/; Stephen
Gardner, EU Lawmakers Back Plan for Bloc-Wide Digital Tax by Year’s End, BLOOMBERG TAX
(Apr. 29, 2021, 3:37 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report/eu-lawmakers-backplan-for-bloc-wide-digital-tax-by-years-end; James Munson, Canada Taxes Tech, Luxury Cars in
First Full Budget Since 2019, BLOOMBERG TAX (Apr. 19, 2021, 4:11 PM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/canada-proposes-luxury-digital-taxes-in-firstbudget-since-2019; Hamza Ali, Developing Countries Get UN Model for Taxing Tech Companies,
BLOOMBERG TAX (Apr. 20, 2021, 1:09 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-taxreport/developing-countries-get-un-model-for-taxing-tech-companies.
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several justifications for digital services taxes—primarily that large
multinational technology businesses are not taxed appropriately through
existing tax regimes—digital services taxes have proved quite
controversial.13
Although digital services taxes vary by country, they share many
fundamental characteristics. Importantly, the digital services taxes are
imposed on the service provider, not the customer. Many providers,
however, will pass these taxes through to the customers, thus shifting the
incidence.14 These taxes are structured as gross receipts or gross revenue
taxes, at a rate of 1.5% to 7.5% of an applicable business’s digital service
gross revenues sourced to that jurisdiction.15 The general scope of digital
services taxes is revenue from online advertising, sales of collected user data,
and digital platforms that facilitate interactions between users. Precisely
defining the tax’s scope, however, has proved challenging and produced
inconsistent regimes across countries.16 Some countries have narrowed the
scope to target digital advertising services, while others have broadened the
scope to encompass most digital services, including content streaming.17
Controversially, digital services taxes generally apply only to very large
multinational technology businesses, almost all of which are United Statesbased companies.18 The Big Five tech companies generated nearly $900
billion in combined revenue in 2019.19 Only seventeen countries had Gross
Domestic Products (“GDPs”) greater than the aggregate revenue of these five
companies.20 Many of the European nations proposing digital services taxes
have GDPs that are dwarfed by these five companies’ revenues.21
Although these five companies have massive revenues, profits, and
market capitalizations, their business models vary significantly. Google and
Facebook derive almost all their revenue from digital advertising, while

13. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Tax Wars: How to End the Conflict over Taxing Global Digital
Commerce, 17 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 347, 349–50 (2020); Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The
Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX REV. 145, 147–48 (2019); Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada,
The Legality of Digital Taxes in Europe, 40 VA. TAX REV. 175, 177–78 (2020); Young Ran
(Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the Consumption Tax Debate,
72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (2020); Michael J. Graetz, A Major Simplification of the OECD’s
Pillar 1 Proposal, 101 TAX NOTES INT’L 199, 199 (2021).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See Asen, supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Fortune 500, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
20. GDP
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true
(last
visited May 19, 2021).
21. Id.
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Amazon, Apple, and Microsoft derive comparatively little revenue from
digital advertising.22 Rather, their core business models are built on online
retail, hardware sales, and software sales, although Amazon’s digital
advertising business is growing rapidly.23 Thus, a digital advertising focus
may be less effective than other approaches discussed below.24
While the digital services tax movement progresses internationally,
there is a corresponding subnational digital tax movement within the United
States.25 States have considered three general approaches thus far. First, the
taxing jurisdiction may impose a new digital advertising gross receipts tax on
digital service providers, similar to the international digital services taxes.26
States are concerned that large digital advertising companies are collecting
and monetizing their residents’ user data and not paying appropriate levels of
tax.27 States are recognizing that user data is arguably the most valuable
resource in the world, and large monopolistic digital service providers are
22. See Jeff Desjardins, How the Tech Giants Make Their Billions, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Mar.
29, 2019), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/how-tech-giants-make-billions/.
23. Id. Amazon also has much lower average profit margins than the other four companies
because of its core retail business, which makes net income taxation much less effective as applied
to Amazon. See Isabel Gottlieb et al., Amazon Taxation Becomes Sticking Point in Talks on Global
Levies, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2021, 6:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202104-20/amazon-taxation-becomes-sticking-point-in-talks-on-global-levies.
24. See infra Part II.
25. At the United States federal level, however, there has been a strong rebuke of international
digital services taxes. See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Maryland’s Proposed Digital Tax May Be
Unconstitutional, MEDIUM (Jan. 30, 2020), https://medium.com/@ProfRuthMason/marylandsproposed-digital-tax-may-be-unconstitutional-9be58831315b; Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.S. to
Slap France with Tariffs over Digital Services Tax, TAX NOTES (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/customs-duties/us-slap-france-tariffs-overdigital-services-tax/2019/12/03/2b5ss. It is possible that the United States could revisit its previous
stance given the change in administration, although that has not been the case thus far. See, e.g.,
Mindy Herzfeld, Resetting Expectations for a Digital Deal Under the Biden Administration, 101
TAX NOTES INT’L 543, 543 (2021); Isabel Gottlieb & Hamza Ali, U.S. OECD Pitch Puts Down
Opening Bid to Roll Back Digital Taxes, BLOOMBERG TAX (Apr. 12, 2021, 11:02 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report-international/u-s-oecd-pitch-puts-down-openingbid-to-roll-back-digital-taxes; Ana Monteiro, U.S. Forges Ahead on $1 Billion Tariff Plan over
Digital
Taxes,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
5,
2021,
2:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-05/u-s-forges-ahead-on-1-billion-tariff-planover-digital-taxes.
26. See, e.g., H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021), S.B. 787, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021); S. 1124, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); L.C. 3237, 67th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021); S.B. 1106, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); H.B. 5645,
2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2021); H.B. 1312, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2021); H. 3081, 192d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2021); H. 2894, 192d Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2021); S.B. 605, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2021); S.B. 558, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2021); H.B. 4467, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021). Only Maryland has enacted a digital
advertising tax thus far, and the proposals in other states have had varying levels of support.
27. For example, a Connecticut legislator introduced a social media advertising tax bill because
these companies “have in effect monetized the data of Connecticut residents.” Lauren Loricchio,
Rep. Proposes Digital Ad Tax on Social Media Companies, 99 TAX NOTES STATE 645, 645 (2021).
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extracting it in exchange for free digital services or for no consideration at
all.28 Maryland legislators explicitly stated that the aim of their digital
advertising tax is to ensure the state adequately taxes the top ten to twelve
leading technology companies.29 Possibly a stronger motivating factor,
digital advertising taxes are enormous revenue sources at a time when many
state and local governments are facing shortfalls.30 Google, Amazon, and
Facebook accounted for almost two-thirds of United States digital advertising
spending in 2020.31 The digital advertising industry has experienced
momentous growth over the past decade, with gross revenue growing over
nineteen percent annually to well over $100 billion in 2019.32 Maryland
estimates that its recently enacted digital advertising tax could generate $250
million annually, which would be dedicated to funding education programs.33
If every state adopted a digital advertising tax, the aggregate annual state tax
revenue could approach $14 billion, with at least $2 billion from Facebook
alone.34
Second, the taxing jurisdiction may attempt to impose a transaction tax
on digital advertising services.35 This latter approach is generally effectuated
by expanding the jurisdiction’s existing sales and use tax regime to
encompass digital advertising services and to impose the tax on the business

28. See, e.g., The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuableresource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data; Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2056 (2004).
29. Lauren Loricchio, Groups Push Back Against Proposed Maryland Digital Ad Tax, TAX
NOTES (Jan. 31, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/gross-receipts-tax/groupspush-back-against-proposed-maryland-digital-adtax/2020/01/31/2c45h?highlight=%22Groups%20Push%20Back%20Against%20Proposed%20Ma
ryland%20Digital%20Ad%20Tax%22.
30. See Mason & Shanske, supra note 4.
31. Mariel Soto Reyes, Google, Facebook, and Amazon Will Account for Nearly Two-Thirds of
Total U.S. Digital Ad Spending This Year, INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2020, 10:16 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/google-facebook-amazon-were-biggest-ad-revenue-winnersthis-year-2020-12.
32. See Sam McQuillan, Maryland to Impose First of Its Kind Digital Advertising Tax,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 16, 2021, 2:36 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecomlaw/maryland-to-impose-first-of-its-kind-digital-ad-tax.
33. Fiscal and Policy Note, H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020),
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2020RS/fnotes/bil_0002/hb0732.pdf.
34. Michael J. Bologna, States Eye Amazon, Facebook, Google for Untapped Digital Ad Tax,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 14, 2020, 4:46 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecomlaw/states-eye-amazon-facebook-google-for-untapped-digital-ad-tax (citing Professor William
Fox).
35. See, e.g., S. 302, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); Council B. 23-760, 23d Council,
Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2020); L.B. 989, 106th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2020); S.B. 1711, 87th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2021).
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paying for the advertisement.36 Opponents assert that a tax on business inputs
violates fundamental tax policy principles, while proponents justify this
approach based on the distinct characteristics of the user-data-driven business
model.37 Specifically, if a jurisdiction imposes sales tax only on consumers
who pay for digital services, it incentivizes consumers to favor competing
service providers that provide free services and that rely on extracting user
data and selling targeted advertising.38
Third, a few states have proposed novel data mining tax regimes.39
These regimes are targeted directly at businesses that extract and monetize
personal data from users in the respective jurisdiction. These proposals have
varied in their form, ranging from an excise tax to a gross receipts tax to a
natural resource severance-type tax. Because there are benefits and
drawbacks to each of these digital tax approaches, and the stakes are so high
for taxing jurisdictions and the technology industry, a comprehensive
analysis of each option is imperative.
II. OPTIONS FOR SUBNATIONAL DIGITAL TAXATION
A subnational digital services tax similar to those in Europe is likely to
encounter United States constitutional and federal preemption challenges.
More targeted digital advertising gross receipts taxes, as enacted in Maryland
and proposed in several states, are even more susceptible.40 New digital
36. This Article focuses on digital service providers and platforms that extract user data and
generally monetize that data directly or indirectly through online advertising. Digital goods, content
streaming services, and other services provided electronically are largely outside the scope of this
Article, although jurisdictions should expand existing sales and use tax regimes to encompass these
services, as discussed in Section II.B. Such an expansion is long overdue as most sales and use tax
regimes fail to adequately address the broader shift to a service-based economy. In addition, many
of the challenges discussed throughout this Article are applicable in the broader discussion of digital
taxation, notably the sourcing challenges discussed in Part IV.
37. See, e.g., Jeff Cook & Philippe Stephanny, International and U.S. Digital Services Taxes –
Qui Vivra Verra, 96 TAX NOTES STATE 605, 608 (2020).
38. Lauren Loricchio, States Could Look to Social Media Taxation to Shore Up Base, 98 TAX
NOTES 744, 744 (2020) (citing Professor William Fox). Professor Fox asserts that “imposing tax
on the non-monetized portion of social media companies could help address this problem.” Id.
39. See S. 4959, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021); H.B. 1303, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2021); H.B. 4898, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2020).
40. Indeed, the first state digital advertising tax enacted was challenged immediately, with
several taxpayer trade associations seeking to enjoin and invalidate the statute. Complaint at 2,
Chamber of Com. v. Franchot, Civ. No. 21-cv-410 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2021). In state court, Comcast
and Verizon also filed a complaint for declaratory judgment. Complaint at 2, Comcast of
Ca./Md./Pa./Va./W. Va. v. Comptroller of Treasury of Md., No. C-02-CV-21-000509 (Md. Cir. Ct.
Anne Arundel Cnty. Apr. 15, 2021). Many of the arguments for declaratory judgment were
undermined, however, when S.B. 787 delayed the new tax’s effective date by a year. This delay
gave the Maryland legislature sufficient time to refine the digital advertising tax statute to cure the
current constitutional, administrative, and procedural defects—notably, to extend existing protest
and refund procedures to encompass the digital advertising tax.
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services tax regimes present multiple taxation concerns as well. Most
jurisdictions already impose net income taxes, and in some cases gross
receipts taxes, on digital service providers. Some jurisdictions already
impose sales and use tax on digital services as well. Thus, a new digital
services tax regime could impose multiple levels of taxation on the same
receipts, which is not inherently unconstitutional but may reflect poor tax
policy.41
One of the most significant concerns is who will bear the incidence of
these new or expanded taxes.42 The subnational legislatures are directly
targeting large digital service providers, which are perceived to be not paying
their fair share of taxes.43 These digital service providers, however, may pass
the tax on to customers—either end users or advertisers, many of whom are
small businesses.44 Certain tax types, such as digital advertising taxes and
sales taxes, are particularly easy to pass through. Digital service providers
could charge the additional tax amount to end users or advertisers directly, or
increase prices for sales sourced to the jurisdiction, both of which would shift
the tax incidence to end users or advertisers.45 Almost immediately after
France enacted its digital services tax, Amazon announced that it would pass
the three percent gross receipts tax through to its French customers, and
Google announced that it would pass through digital services taxes in France
and Spain.46 Digital service providers could instead withdraw from the

41. For example, if a state with an existing corporate income tax was to enact a digital
advertising tax, digital advertisers would be subject to a new gross receipts tax on their advertising
revenue and a corporate net income tax that would include that advertising revenue in gross income.
The state could also impose sales tax on advertising, thus taxing the advertising payment three times.
Depending on tax rates, the advertising payment could be subject to over seventeen percent tax on
the gross payment amount and twelve percent on the net amount. In addition, if other states enact
digital advertising taxes and their sourcing methods conflict, the taxpayer could be subject to tax in
multiple states on the same advertising revenue. And all of the foregoing morass could potentially
be replicated at the local level.
42. See Mason & Shanske, supra note 4.
43. Prior to Maryland passing its digital advertising tax, a state senator “argued that the bill will
ensure that companies like Facebook and Google that have profited during the pandemic pay their
fair share.” Lauren Loricchio, Maryland Becomes First State to Adopt Digital Ad Tax, TAX NOTES
(Feb. 16, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/litigation-and-appeals/marylandbecomes-first-state-adopt-digital-ad-tax/2021/02/16/2zdbp.
44. In opposition, another Maryland state senator stated, “Facebook will be fine; the small
businesses will be hurt.” Id.
45. The tax statute could attempt to prevent at least a direct pass-through to end users or
advertisers, although these provisions may make matters worse by reducing transparency. Maryland
amended its new digital advertising tax to prohibit providers from “directly” passing on the tax to
its advertising customers “by means of a separate fee, surcharge, or line-item.” S.B. 787, 2021 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
46. Todd Buell, Amazon Raising Fees on French Sellers After Digital Tax, LAW360 (Aug. 1,
2019, 1:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184355/amazon-raising-fees-on-french-sellersafter-digital-tax; Sam Edwards, Google Will Pass Digital Tax on to Spanish, French Customers,
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jurisdiction altogether, which would likely have severe and immediate
political repercussions when that jurisdiction’s residents lose access to
mainstream digital services and small businesses lose access to affordable
targeted advertising.47 Or, the digital service providers could increase the
cost of their services and advertising universally to offset the respective
jurisdiction’s tax costs, resulting in the provider’s global customer base
subsidizing that jurisdiction’s spending.
If the digital service provider does not shift the tax incidence to end
users or advertisers, the incidence will be borne either by employees or
shareholders.48 Businesses can easily shift tax incidence to employees
through lower wages or reduced benefits, which is very common.49 The
corporation’s shareholders bear the balance of any new or increased tax on
the corporation.
Jurisdictions have options beyond a digital advertising gross receipts tax
that may more effectively achieve their goals while minimizing
constitutional, federal preemption, administrative, and tax policy concerns.
Jurisdictions can expand existing tax regimes—such as sales tax or corporate
income tax regimes—to more appropriately tax digital services. A powerful
benefit to modifying an existing tax regime is minimizing compliance and
enforcement burdens, particularly at the subnational level where corporations
may have filing obligations in thousands of jurisdictions.50 Using an existing
subnational corporate net income tax also raises fewer questions as to
whether the taxpayer can deduct the state taxes paid for federal tax

BLOOMBERG TAX (Mar. 4, 2021, 10:53 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-reportinternational/google-will-pass-digital-tax-on-to-spanish-french-customers.
47. Although withdrawing from a market may appear improbable, Google threatened to
withdraw from Australia when the country required payments to news organizations for their
content. Nick Perry, Google Threatens to Pull Search Engine in Australia, AP NEWS (Jan. 22,
2021), https://apnews.com/article/international-news-australia-new-zealand-scott-morrison-bills06e735a2f7670c35c4000ec8059cdced. Withdrawing from a subnational jurisdiction would be even
easier, especially for a smaller jurisdiction like Maryland.
48. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, A New Corporate Tax, 99 TAX NOTES INT’L 497, 498–99
(2020). Professor Avi-Yonah recognizes that corporate taxes do not effectively impose tax on large
shareholders, but rather a stock-based tax would be more effective. See infra Section II.D for a
discussion of stock-based taxes.
49. Wiji Arulampalam, Michael P. Devereux & Giorgia Maffini, The Direct Incidence of
Corporate Income Tax on Wages, 56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1038, 1040 (2012) (concluding that
approximately fifty percent of a corporate income tax increase is passed on to employees in the long
run directly through lower wages, and an additional amount may be passed on indirectly); Clemens
Fuest, Andreas Peichl & Sebastian Siegloch, Do Higher Corporate Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro
Evidence from Germany, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 415 (2018) (concluding that approximately
fifty-one percent of a local business tax increase is passed on to employees directly through reduced
wages).
50. See Andrew Appleby, Targeted Taxes: Localities Take Aim at Large Employers to Solve
Homelessness and Transportation Challenges, 98 OR. L. REV. 477, 517–19 (2020).
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purposes.51 Alternatively, jurisdictions may consider novel tax regimes that
may be better suited to address the unique aspects of user-data-based digital
services. This Part analyzes each option, focusing on efficacy, validity, and
optimal design principles.
A. Digital Services or Advertising Gross Receipts Tax
Although digital advertising taxes are very narrow and have flaws, they
are subnational jurisdictions’ favored approach thus far.52 The proclivity for
these taxes likely stems from states’ desperation to raise revenue and to tax
large technology companies, with European digital services taxes providing
a blueprint to accomplish these goals. Modeling a new state tax regime based
on controversial and not yet successful international regimes is not an ideal
strategy, especially considering additional constitutional and federal
preemption constraints.53 Regardless, states are pressing forward, and even
if these digital advertising tax regimes are unsuccessful, they may create
enough inertia and political viability for more effective tax regimes such as
those discussed below.
The digital advertising tax proposals thus far have been quite similar.
The definitions of key terms such as “digital advertising service,” “annual
gross revenue,” and “user” have been refreshingly consistent. Uniformity is
generally a chimera in state and local taxation, but because jurisdictions are
crafting these novel provisions simultaneously, they are adopting fairly
uniform definitions and operative provisions. This approach is universally
beneficial because (1) it is easier for legislatures across the country to craft
their respective legislation, (2) taxing jurisdictions and taxpayers can
consolidate legal challenges, and (3) when an iteration of digital advertising
tax is sustained, taxpayers will have uniform laws that will minimize
compliance burdens and potential multiple taxation.
The digital advertising tax definitions are consistent, reasonable, and
intuitive for the most part. As with any tax provision, there will certainly be
disputes as to whether certain services fall within the statutory definition.
And there are a few interesting deviations. Indiana’s proposed tax statute has
an added focus on social media providers and uses the number of Indiana

51. See I.R.C. § 164 (allowing a deduction for state and local income taxes). It is unclear
whether some of the new taxes discussed below would fall within the scope of “[s]tate and local
personal property taxes” or “[s]tate and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and excess profits
taxes.” See id. If these state and local digital taxes are allowed as deductions, the federal
government is effectively subsidizing these taxes. At least under the previous administration, there
was a strong apathy toward European digital services taxes, so there could be a federal initiative to
deny deductions for these novel state and local taxes.
52. See, e.g., supra note 26.
53. See Cook & Stephanny, supra note 37.
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users, along with gross receipts, to trigger the tax.54 Indiana would also
impose an additional $1 tax per Indiana user.55 New York’s digital
advertising tax would be limited to advertising services that use personal
information about the user to whom the advertisements are being served.56
Many digital tax proposals hypothecate the revenues for specific purposes,
usually education, as does Maryland’s digital advertising tax.57
The digital advertising tax operative provisions are very similar as well.
They impose an economic nexus threshold of advertising revenues sourced
to that jurisdiction that exceed $1 million.58 The tax base is the taxpayer’s
digital advertising gross receipts apportioned to the jurisdiction.59 There are,
however, at least three problematic aspects in these statutes’ initial designs.
First, to determine the digital advertising gross receipts apportioned to the
jurisdiction, the statutes use the percentage of digital advertising gross
receipts in the jurisdiction over digital advertising gross receipts in the United
States.60 Significant sourcing difficulties aside, this formula is inherently
problematic.61 The pre-apportioned tax base appears to be worldwide gross
digital advertising revenues, so an appropriate apportionment formula would
use worldwide digital advertising gross receipts as the denominator, not just
receipts from the United States.62 Alternatively, the tax base could be
54. H.B. 1312, 122d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021).
55. Id.
56. S. 1124, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
57. H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
58. See, e.g., id. It is unclear if this economic nexus threshold satisfies constitutional standards,
although the dollar amount is significantly higher than the amount recently upheld for sales and use
tax purposes. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018).
59. See, e.g., H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
60. See id.
61. An initial sourcing issue is that the statutes do not establish a sourcing methodology.
Rather, they delegate to the taxing authority the responsibility to establish a viable sourcing
methodology, presumably by promulgating a formal regulation. The Maryland Comptroller’s
proposed regulations include a sourcing methodology based on the location of each device that
accesses digital advertising as a proxy for revenue, which sacrifices accuracy for administrative
practicality. See 48:21 Md. Reg. 896 (Oct. 8, 2021). In addition, the proposed apportionment factor
uses the number of devices that access the advertising and not the number of times a device accesses
the advertising, so a device in Maryland that accesses an advertisement one time appears to get the
same representation as a device in Maryland that accesses thousands of the taxpayer’s
advertisements. Id. The proposed regulations instruct taxpayers to determine the location of the
device using the method that “most reliably identifies a device’s location,” and if the location cannot
be determined the device is removed from both the numerator and denominator of the apportionment
formula. Id. See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the myriad sourcing issues that taxing
authorities must address.
62. For example, if a multinational digital advertising company had $20 billion in annual
worldwide gross revenue and it all was designated as digital advertising revenue, its tax base would
be $20 billion. If it had digital advertising revenue of $100 million sourced to Maryland and $10
billion sourced to the United States overall, its Maryland apportionment formula would be one
percent. The company’s Maryland digital advertising tax base would be one percent of $20 billion,
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narrowed to United States digital advertising gross receipts. The current
apportionment formula will almost always tax extraterritorial receipts and
will often produce absurd and unconstitutional results, assuming the
apportionment formula is even intended to be used.63
Second, once the tax base is determined, the statute imposes different
tax rates based on the taxpayer’s worldwide gross revenues. The rate
increases are significant, ranging from 2.5% to 10%.64 In Maryland and New
York, for example, the highest rate applies to taxpayers with total worldwide
gross revenues exceeding $15 billion.65 This rate structure is itself
problematic for three reasons. First, the metric is all gross revenues, not just
digital advertising gross revenues. So, a large taxpayer that has a small digital
advertising aspect of their business may face a ten percent tax rate on its
problematically apportioned digital advertising gross revenues. Second, the
Maryland rate structure imposes a notch effect. If a taxpayer has worldwide
gross revenues of $1 billion, they multiply all their apportioned digital
advertising gross receipts by 2.5% to determine their tax liability. But if the
taxpayer has worldwide gross revenues of $1 billion plus $1, they multiply
their apportioned digital advertising gross receipts by five percent. Thus, one
additional dollar of worldwide gross receipts may double digital advertising
tax liability. These classifications based on gross revenue may also raise
constitutional concerns, particularly if the state has a broad uniformity
provision, as discussed below.66
Third, the current digital advertising tax statutes fail to properly define
the taxpayer. Each imposes tax on a “person,” which they define as including
a “partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other entity.”67
Inexplicably, these statutes fail to define a taxpayer to include an affiliated
group of entities. Under the current definitions, large multinational digital
advertising companies could create separate legal entities to significantly
minimize these taxes. At the simplest level, they could create two entities to
bifurcate United States revenue and international revenue, thus dropping the

or $200 million. Applying Maryland’s highest ten percent tax rate, the company would pay $20
million in Maryland digital advertising tax. Thus, the company is in effect paying tax at a twenty
percent rate in this example.
63. See infra Section III.A. The Maryland Comptroller’s proposed regulations use devices in
Maryland over devices worldwide. 48:21 Md. Reg. 896 (Oct. 8, 2021). This apportionment formula
remedies the obvious extraterritorial taxation issue, but the proposed regulations conflict with the
apportionment formula in the statute itself.
64. Most digital advertising tax bills exempt entities that generate less than $100 million in
annual gross receipts. See, e.g., H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
65. See, e.g., id.; S. 1124, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
66. See infra Sections III.A, III.C.
67. See, e.g., H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
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putative taxpayer into a much lower applicable tax rate.68 Many localities
made this mistake with their initial targeted tech taxes, discussed in this Part
below, but subsequent localities realized the error and designed their
provisions accordingly.69 States will likely amend their statutes to include
affiliated groups, although some may rely on administrative regulations to do
so, an approach that could be susceptible to challenge.
Although not a specific digital advertising gross receipts tax,
jurisdictions may have a more nuanced and discrete option to tax large digital
advertisers using a general gross receipts tax regime.70 Jurisdictions that have
an existing general gross receipts tax could attempt to impose higher tax rates
for certain broadly defined services or industries. Washington’s gross
receipts tax regime, for example, incorporates this feature already.71 Indeed,
Washington has proposed a new category for sales of personal data within its
existing gross receipts tax, discussed further below.72 As long as the tax rate
applies equally to all services in a specified category, even if most services
in that category are delivered electronically, the higher rate for that category
should not discriminate against electronic commerce and would achieve the
goal of additional taxation of digital services.
Many localities, particularly on the West Coast, are also targeting large
digital service providers for increased taxes, but not with digital-specific
taxes. Instead, these localities are imposing new or increased general gross
receipts taxes only on the largest businesses operating in the jurisdiction,
most of which happen to be large digital service providers.73
B. Sales and Use Tax
The easiest approach to tax digital services generally is for taxing
jurisdictions to simply expand their existing sales and use tax regimes to
include all services.74 Several recent, thoughtful proposals have suggested
68. In addition, this separate entity approach is problematic as applied to intercompany
transactions. This approach could result in imposing tax multiple times on the same gross receipts
belonging to the same federal consolidated group.
69. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
70. Conversely, a nuanced and discrete approach likely lacks the signaling function of the
digital advertising tax or targeted tech tax.
71. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.04.010–.440 (2021); infra note 137 and accompanying text.
72. See infra Section II.F.
73. See Appleby, supra note 50.
74. Imposing a new or increased tax may still face procedural hurdles such as supermajority
approval requirements or other tax increase limitations. See Andrew Appleby, Designing the Tax
Supermajority Requirement, 71 SYRACUSE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3–4),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3723907. Colorado is grappling with how to
impose tax on digital goods and streaming services within the constraints of its constitutional tax
increase limitation provisions. See, e.g., Tripp Baltz, Streaming ‘Netflix Tax’ in Colorado Raises
Risk
of
Litigation,
BLOOMBERG
LAW
(Jan.
11,
2021,
4:45
AM),
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expanding existing sales and use tax regimes to encompass services,
particularly digital goods, content streaming services, and other services
provided electronically.75 If comprehensive service expansion is too
extreme, a taxing jurisdiction could include in the scope of its sales and use
tax enumerated digital services, as long as corresponding non-digital services
are included as well. For example, a state could impose sales and use tax on
all advertising services, whether digital or print.76 Broadening the sales and
use tax base is not only a viable alternative for digital service taxation, but it
reflects sound tax policy and is long overdue.
Although subnational jurisdictions have tended toward digital
advertising gross receipts tax proposals thus far, several have proposed taxing
digital advertising under their existing sales and use tax regimes.77 As with
digital advertising tax proposals, most sales tax proposals have similar
language defining the taxable digital advertising service.78 The District of
Columbia’s proposal was a bit broader, in that it proposed to tax all
advertising services and also the sale of personal information.79 New York’s
sales tax proposal would deposit all revenue into a fund for zero interest
refinancing of higher education loans.80 Otherwise, the proposals were quite
straightforward—each would impose existing sales tax on this new type of
transaction.81
The primary argument against imposing a consumption tax on
advertising, in particular, is that consumption taxes should not apply to
business inputs because the end product is likely subject to consumption tax
when it is eventually sold.82 Thus, sales tax would be imposed twice,
resulting in tax pyramiding. Although taxing business inputs is generally
disfavored from a tax policy perspective, it is not uncommon. Approximately

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/streaming-netflix-tax-in-colorado-raisesrisk-of-litigation.
75. See, e.g., Orly Mazur & Adam Thimmesch, Closing the Digital Divide in State Taxation:
A Consumption Tax Agenda, 98 TAX NOTES STATE 961, 962–63 (2020); Gladriel Shobe et al., Why
States Should Consider Expanding Sales Taxes to Services, Part 1, 98 TAX NOTES STATE 1349,
1351–53 (2020); Grace Stephenson Nielsen et al., How States Should Now Consider Expanding
Sales Taxes to Services, Part 2, 99 TAX NOTES STATE 45, 45 (2021).
76. Such an approach was famously unsuccessful in the 1980s because of political pressure
from the advertising industry. See Walter Hellerstein, Florida’s Sales Tax on Services, 41 NAT’L
TAX J. 1, 1 (1988). The rise of Internet advertising, however, has created structural changes that
arguably justify this sales tax expansion.
77. See supra note 35.
78. See supra note 35.
79. Council B. 23-760, 23d Council, Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2020).
80. S. 302, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
81. Sourcing, of course, is never straightforward in the digital context. See infra Part IV.
82. See, e.g., Cook & Stephanny, supra note 37.
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forty percent of the average sales tax base currently consists of business
inputs.83
In the case of digital advertising, imposing sales tax is also arguably
justified. As discussed above, in the prevailing business model, a digital
service provider offers a service—such as email, a search engine, or social
media—to end users and collects their personal data.84 The company
provides the service either free or for a vastly subsidized price. The company
then monetizes the user data to sell targeted advertisements to businesses,
with these advertisements often disseminated through the free or subsidized
service to end users. If the company charged end users a market price for the
service and a state imposed sales tax on that charge, there would be no
pyramiding problem. Here, the advertisers are effectively paying the end
users’ service fees.85 Thus, imposing sales tax on the amount effectively paid
for the end user service—even though it is paid by the advertiser and not the
end user—functions as a consumption tax and not a tax on business inputs.
Imposing sales tax on payments made by digital advertisers serves as a proxy
for the sales tax that would have been imposed on the end user if the digital
service provider did not extract and monetize user data but instead charged a
market price for the advertising-free service.86
Although expanding existing sales and use tax regimes to encompass
digital advertising is much easier for taxing jurisdictions, the proposed digital
advertising gross receipts tax regimes discussed above will likely generate
far more revenue. They may also serve a stronger signaling, or even
regulatory, function because of their targeted imposition.
C. Corporate Income Tax Surcharge or Surtax
Another option within many jurisdictions’ existing tax regimes is a
corporate income tax surcharge or surtax.87 For example, a jurisdiction could
83. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & ANDREW D. APPLEBY, STATE
TAXATION ¶ 12.03 (3d ed. 2021 rev.). “For example, transportation equipment, office furniture,
advertising catalogs, and supplies purchased by manufacturers and other businesses are usually
taxable under state sales taxes.” Id.
84. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
85. For example, a user can purchase a YouTube Premium account for approximately $12 per
month, which eliminates advertisements (although their user data is still being extracted). With free
YouTube accounts, advertisers are effectively paying the $12 per month fee for the users to
YouTube. See, e.g., Robert Goulder, Should Data Extraction Be Taxed As a Natural Resource?, 99
TAX NOTES INT’L 559, 560 (2020); David R. Agrawal & William F. Fox, Taxing Goods and
Services in a Digital Era, 74 NAT’L TAX J. 257, 291–93 (2021).
86. One could also make the less precise, but colorable, argument that imposing a new tax
somewhere in the transaction chain is appropriate because there is so much value inuring to large
digital advertisers that is going untaxed under existing tax regimes.
87. See, e.g., Darien Shanske et al., Reforming State Corporate Income Taxes Can Yield
Billions, 96 TAX NOTES STATE 1211, 1214 (2020). Yet another alternative is a minimum corporate
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impose an additional five percent corporate income tax rate on corporations
that derive a certain amount of revenue from digital advertising, or on
corporations that generate a certain amount of overall gross revenue.88
Jurisdictions could incorporate a progressive rate structure, particularly in a
manner that avoids the notch effect present in the digital advertising tax
regimes discussed in Section II.A. A jurisdiction could also adopt a more
tailored approach, such as an excessive CEO compensation surtax, depending
on its motivations for the tax.89 This tailored approach serves a stronger
signaling function than does a general surtax on corporations that generate a
certain amount of gross revenue.90
There are advantages to leveraging an existing tax regime. The
compliance and enforcement burdens are reduced for the taxing authority and
taxpayers. There will likely be significantly less resistance from large digital
service providers than with an entirely new tax regime. And subnational
corporate income tax regimes have already addressed many of the
mechanical difficulties discussed above, albeit imperfectly.91 For example,
many state corporate income tax regimes require combined reporting or add
back certain intercompany payments, which forecloses many tax planning
strategies that would easily allow digital service providers to avoid the tax.92
Existing corporate income tax regimes have also already addressed

tax on book income. The Biden Administration has proposed a fifteen percent minimum tax on
book income, which would impact large multinational technology companies. If such a tax existed
in 2020, Google would have paid an additional $847 million in federal corporate tax, while Amazon
would have paid an additional $1.2 billion and Apple would have paid an additional $3.8 billion.
See Jackie Davalos & Alistair Barr, Big Tech $100 Billion Foreign-Profit Hoard Targeted by Tax
Plan, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 22, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0422/big-tech-100-billion-foreign-profit-hoard-targeted-by-tax-plan; see also Stephanie Soong
Johnston, U.S. Opens with 15 Percent Minimum Tax Rate in OECD Reform Talks, 171 TAX NOTES
FED. 1281, 1281 (2021).
88. The surtax could also analyze a taxpayer’s net income tax due to the jurisdiction and simply
increase that tax amount by a percentage. Portland, Oregon’s excessive CEO compensation tax
functions in this manner and imposes an additional ten to twenty-five percent tax. PORTLAND, OR.,
CITY CODE § 7.02.500(E) (2020); Business Tax Administrative Rule 500.17-1, CITY OF PORTLAND,
https://www.portland.gov/policies/licensing-and-income-taxes/fees/lic-502-pay-ratio-surtax (last
visited Oct. 24, 2021).
89. See supra note 88.
90. Introducing aspects of gross revenue into a net income tax is inherently problematic. A
fundamental premise of a net income tax is to impose tax based on ability to pay, which must take
into account costs of doing business. Gross receipts taxes violate the ability-to-pay principle,
particularly as applied to low profit margin industries such as grocery stores and wholesalers, which
is why many gross receipts taxes have industry-specific exemptions or lower rates. Although basing
corporate net income tax rates on a taxpayer’s gross receipts is less problematic than imposing a
gross receipts tax, it is still a blunt approach that does not fully reflect the ability-to-pay principle.
91. See supra Section II.A.
92. See, e.g., Shanske et al., supra note 87, at 1215–16 (discussing worldwide combined
reporting); HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 8.11, 8.18.
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apportionment and sourcing, often with detailed statutes and regulations that
took years to refine.93
With that said, many jurisdictions may not find a corporate income tax
surcharge very compelling. Although it is likely the easiest approach to adopt
and administer, it is not ideally suited to achieve the jurisdictions’ goals. The
underlying justification for the subnational digital advertising tax movement
is that existing corporate net income tax regimes do not adequately tax large
technology companies, specifically digital advertising companies.94 Simply
increasing the rate of an ineffective tax is unlikely to remedy that perceived
problem.95 Subnational corporate net income taxes are easy to manipulate,
and even if a state imposes a higher tax rate, the tax base may still be nominal,
certainly when compared to a gross receipts tax. Digital service providers
could withdraw from the jurisdiction, especially if the jurisdiction utilizes a
single sales factor apportionment formula with market-based sourcing. And
for better or worse, it is more difficult for a taxing jurisdiction to target
specific taxpayers using their existing corporate income tax.96 Jurisdictions
must consider constitutional and federal preemption limitations as well.97
But if the other options discussed in this Part are not politically viable, a
jurisdiction may want to consider a corporate net income tax surcharge or
surtax, which would provide at least some level of additional revenue and
signaling.

93. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 8.05, 8.14, 9.18.
94. See Marian, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5) (asserting that with the current global economy,
an income tax should not be the prevailing mode of taxation, but that “data” would be the
preferred—or at least a supplemental—tax base).
95. Indeed, large multinational technology companies are counterintuitively supporting a
higher federal corporate net income tax rate, which improves optics without meaningful economic
impact. See Lydia O’Neal & David Hood, New Tech Lobby Curries Favor with Rare Embrace of
Higher Taxes, BLOOMBERG TAX (May 17, 2021, 4:46 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/dailytax-report/new-tech-lobby-curries-favor-with-rare-embrace-of-higher-taxes.
96. For example, it may be difficult to impose the higher rate just on the portion of net income
from digital advertising. If a jurisdiction imposes a surtax based on gross revenue, it will be
imposing the higher rate on all the corporation’s activities, not just digital advertising. With that
said, despite the political ire directed toward digital advertising, many of the targeted corporations
derive very little revenue from digital advertising. Thus, a less tailored approach may generate more
revenue and tax the targeted corporations more effectively.
97. Although the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) typically arises in transaction tax or gross
receipts tax contexts, ITFA’s broad language encompasses corporate net income taxes. The
discrimination analysis, however, is much more difficult in the corporate net income tax context
because there is not a direct tax imposition on a transaction that can be classified as electronic or
traditional. See infra Section III.E.
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D. Stock-Based Tax
An intriguing alternative is to impose tax on corporations based on the
value of their stock.98 Although digital advertising companies have been the
specific target of subnational jurisdictions recently, the jurisdictions’
underlying motivations may be better served with a focus toward publicly
traded corporations that enjoy excessive market valuations. If taxing
jurisdictions are correct that the largest corporations are not paying their fair
share of taxes under existing regimes, the stock market will reflect that
additional profitability through increased stock prices. Those stock prices
will also theoretically reflect the corporation’s asset value plus the
corporation’s discounted future earnings potential.99
One option is to impose an annual tax on publicly traded corporations
based on the market price of each share of outstanding stock.100 For example,
a jurisdiction could impose a one percent tax on the average value of
outstanding shares over the course of the taxable year. Another option is an
annual tax on publicly traded corporations based on the increase of the market
price of each share of outstanding stock over the course of the taxable year.101
This increase approach, however, would introduce volatility into the tax base
and would reduce tax revenues during recessions when subnational
jurisdictions need revenue most. Jurisdictions could also use more
sophisticated metrics, such as a stock’s price-to-earnings or price-to-sales
ratio, to tailor the tax base or rate to accomplish more specific goals.102
Because the tax base is determined by public markets, the opportunity for tax
planning and minimization is essentially eliminated.103
98. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, How to Tax Capital, 70 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (2016); Michael S.
Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1996); see also Joseph M.
Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration
Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 265, 266–67 (1995); Joseph Bankman, A Market-Value Based Corporate
Income Tax, 68 TAX NOTES 1347, 1347–48 (1995). Another alternative is requiring large
technology companies to capitalize, rather than expense, their intangible costs. See Calvin H.
Johnson, A Fair Income Tax on the Trillion-Dollar Behemoths, 171 TAX NOTES FED. 1199, 1199
(2021).
99. It is unclear if the current stock market is pricing stocks rationally or if there are other
motivations that may be altering stock prices. See, e.g., Jason Gewirtz, GameStop Head-Spinning
Volatility May Be Only the Beginning of a New Wave, CNBC (Jan. 28, 2021, 2:47 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/gamestop-head-spinning-volatility-may-be-only-thebeginning.html. The corporation benefits from its increased stock price, however, regardless of
purchasers’ motivations. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, Tesla, Already Worth $600 Billion, Wants to Raise
Another
$5
Billion
in
Stock,
CNN BUS. (Dec.
8,
2020,
8:04
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/08/investing/tesla-stock-sale/index.html.
100. Gergen, supra note 98, at 1–2.
101. Knoll, supra note 98.
102. Either of these ratios may indicate that independent investors value the business model more
than reflected in a net income tax regime.
103. See Gergen, supra note 98, at 5.
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Stock-based taxes are intuitive, logical, and can be easy to administer.
The tax base can be straightforward and based on objective publicly available
information. It would be very easy to draw a cutoff point or implement
progressive rates, thus reducing or eliminating the tax burden for smaller
corporations. These taxes would also be effective, as a market capitalizationbased tax would most directly impact the Big Five tech companies, plus other
common targets such as Tesla.104 With stock-based taxes, the incidence will
likely be borne by shareholders because of the nature of the tax, which may
provide an added benefit in the context of recent stock trading behavior.105
In addition, states have been imposing capital stock taxes for decades,
so corporate taxpayers and taxing authorities have familiarity with the
concept. A market-based stock tax would differ from existing capital stock
taxes and present several advantages. Capital stock taxes were popular with
states a half century ago when three-quarters of the states imposed capital
stock taxes and they produced substantial revenue.106 Their role was
diminished greatly over time, and now fewer than half the states impose
capital stock taxes. They are often limited in scope and amount, and several
states are phasing out or replacing capital stock taxes with other taxes.107
Existing capital stock taxes are plagued by complex valuation methods—as
opposed to simply looking at publicly traded stock prices—and many
exemptions.108 Most importantly, current capital stock tax rates are
miniscule, with many just over 0.1% of apportioned value, and with many
incorporating low annual tax caps.109
A jurisdiction could easily replace its existing or former capital stock
tax with a simpler and more effective version. The jurisdiction could impose
the tax only on publicly traded corporations and use market pricing to
determine the tax base. If a jurisdiction were to eliminate its corporate net
income tax and replace it with a stock-based tax, the jurisdiction could
reverse engineer a rate that roughly approximates the tax revenue it generated
under the prior regime and adjust accordingly. Alternatively, because this
approach would be limited in that it imposes tax only on publicly traded

104. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 99.
106. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 11.01.
107. Id.; see, e.g., Jared Walczak, Trends in State Tax Policy, 2018, 87 TAX NOTES STATE 577,
578 (2018).
108. Because these taxes generally apply to privately held corporations and even pass-through
entities, the valuation procedure is necessarily more complex and less verifiable. See HELLERSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 11.04.
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 48-13-73(a) (West 2021) (capping capital stock tax at $5,000); ALA.
CODE § 40-14A-22(d) (West 2021) (capping capital stock tax at $15,000); see, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 105-122(d2) (West 2021) (imposing a 0.15% capital stock tax rate).
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corporations, a jurisdiction may prefer to use the stock-based tax in addition
to its existing corporate net income tax.
As a general matter, subnational capital stock taxes are constitutional,
although they must incorporate a fair apportionment methodology for
multistate taxpayers because the tax base is a corporation’s entire value.110
States have used various apportionment methods, including three-factor
formulas of property, payroll, and receipts.111 The United States Supreme
Court has also upheld a single receipts factor for apportioning a capital stock
tax.112 A single receipts factor, particularly with a market-based sourcing
method, is the easiest option and is consistent with the broader trend of
apportionment for corporate net income taxes. An annual tax on the market
value of publicly traded stock represents a simple approach that would
generate substantial revenue and accomplish jurisdictions’ goals of taxing
large corporations that arguably have excess profits and market valuation,
including the largest digital advertisers and many other companies that profit
from user data.
E. Data Ad Valorem Tax
If a jurisdiction’s primary goal is to tax the value of the data that
businesses extract—generally without direct payment—from the
jurisdiction’s residents, an ad valorem tax on the data would accomplish this
goal. Property taxes based on the property value, or ad valorem taxes, are
incredibly common in the United States, especially at the local level.113
Although real property ad valorem taxes are the most prevalent and
economically significant, many subnational taxing jurisdictions also impose
ad valorem taxes on personal property.114 Many fewer jurisdictions,
however, impose ad valorem tax on intangible personal property.115 It is not
completely clear if data constitutes tangible or intangible property, and that
determination could vary based on the specific facts. Regardless, a
jurisdiction could enact a data ad valorem tax and avoid the issue as long as

110. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 11.02, 11.05. At the national level, the United
States may face different constitutional challenges to a stock-based tax. See Gergen, supra note 98,
at 1 n.3.
111. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 11.05[4].
112. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 335 (1939); see also HELLERSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 83, ¶ 11.05[4][a][i].
113. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 1.01–.02.
114. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.001 (West 2021); TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. § 11.01(a) (West 2021); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 59, § 2 (West 2021) (imposing
property tax on real and personal property). Many jurisdictions allow significant exemptions to
their personal property ad valorem taxes. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.183 (West 2021).
115. Some state constitutions expressly bar intangible property ad valorem taxes. See, e.g., N.Y.
CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
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the state’s constitution did not prohibit such a tax.116 In addition, many states
impose ad valorem taxes on natural resources, which have many similarities
to data.117
The most significant challenge is valuing the data for ad valorem tax
purposes. Valuation is always a challenge, but even more so in the context
of data.118 Data is not fungible and there is no market price for data as a
commodity. In some business models a jurisdiction could use advertising
revenue as a proxy for the value of the data, but advertisers pay for aspects
beyond just the data, including processing, analytics, and the actual
advertising placement. Another possible valuation method is determining the
price of a service through a pay-for-privacy model. If a digital service
provider charged a user a certain fee in return for not tracking the user’s data,
the provider would essentially be selling its “ability to commercially exploit
user data in return for a fixed price.”119 Although this approach is logical, it
is not a practical option for most data mining business models. Another
difficulty is how frequently to assess the value of the property and impose
the tax.
Beyond valuation difficulties, many states have constitutional
provisions that impose stringent requirements on property taxes. The most
relevant are uniformity provisions that require uniform ad valorem property
taxation, although most state constitutions do permit property
classification.120 Some state constitutions allow for more flexibility with
classifications than others, but at the very least, the tax rates and assessment
methodologies should be uniform within the classification.121
Although data ad valorem taxes are the most direct approach to tax the
value of user data, there are myriad obstacles, constitutional and practical, for
jurisdictions to navigate. Nevertheless, data ad valorem taxes may be a viable
option for localities if their taxing jurisdiction is limited to property taxes.
F. Data Mining Tax
If a jurisdiction’s primary motivation is to impose tax on the value
associated with collecting and monetizing user data, a direct tax on data
collection is an optimal approach. A data mining tax will more effectively

116. See id.
117. See infra Section II.F; see, e.g., W. Va. State Tax Dep’t, Admin. Notice 2021-02 (Jan. 29,
2021),
https://tax.wv.gov/Documents/AdministrativeNotices/2021/AdministrativeNotice.202102.pdf.
118. A better alternative may be a tax based solely on the volume of data (e.g., per gigabyte).
See Marian, supra note 1 (manuscript at 46).
119. Goulder, supra note 85.
120. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 2.01–.02.
121. Id.
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reach the value of the user data than a tax using some other activity, such as
digital advertising, as a proxy.
New York recently proposed a data mining tax structured as a monthly
excise tax.122 New York’s proposal is well-designed and remedies many of
the drafting errors and concerns associated with most digital advertising tax
proposals discussed above. The proposal defines the taxpayer by referencing
the federal consolidated return group, thus aggregating related entities, which
is crucial for determining tax rates and thresholds with a progressive rate
structure.123 The proposal carves out certain user data to avoid imposing the
tax on normal online retail activity in which a seller must collect shipping
address and payment data to process a transaction.124 The proposal expressly
defines data collection to include electronic and non-electronic methods, and
provides a credit for data mining taxes paid to other jurisdictions.125 These
provisions strongly reduce any Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA)
discriminatory and multiple tax concerns.126 The proposal is not perfect,
however. The draft language has ambiguity in a crucial provision that states:
“A New York consumer shall be counted only once in the calculation of the
monthly excise tax imposed on a commercial data collector.”127 It is unclear
if this provision means a consumer is counted only once per month, or once
ever. If the latter, this provision would essentially convert the data mining
tax to a one-time imposition, which does not appear to reflect the legislative
intent or structure of the bill.128
Assuming the legislature intended the former interpretation, the data
mining tax would generate enormous revenue. The provision uses a
progressive rate structure that eliminates notch issues and protects smaller
businesses.129 But the provision would impose significant tax amounts on
large data collectors. Data collectors who collect data on more than ten
million New York consumers in a month would pay a monthly tax of $2.25
million plus $0.50 for each New York consumer above ten million. Thus, a
data collector’s tax could approach $7 million each month, or $84 million
annually, if they consistently collect data on essentially all New York
residents.130 If every state adopted a similar tax, large data collectors such as
Google could face aggregate state data mining taxes exceeding $1 billion
122. S. 4959, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See infra Section III.E.
127. S. 4959, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
128. See id.
129. Id.
130. See Quick Facts: N.Y., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NY (last
visited Oct. 24, 2021).
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annually.131 Although those revenue projections may appeal to states
initially, they may be so severe that they elicit meaningful negative responses
from businesses that rely on data collection and otherwise benefit those
jurisdictions.132 These businesses could withdraw from certain jurisdictions,
although New York is likely significant enough to avoid that response even
if it is the only state to enact such a tax. These businesses, however, will
likely pass at least a portion of these new taxes to their customers.133
Washington also proposed a new category for sales of personal data
within its existing general gross receipts tax.134 The legislature’s justification
for the new tax category and rate is that businesses are aggregating and
compiling personal data and reselling it without any compensation to the
people of the state.135 Although the sourcing methodology is similar to New
York’s data mining tax, Washington’s gross receipts tax is a flat rate of 1.8%
of gross receipts.136 This rate is higher than Washington’s current highest
rate, imposed on services at 1.5%, and much higher than the general retail
rate of less than 0.5%.137
An overarching challenge is the complexity and opacity of the data
industry. In addition to the obvious market leaders such as Google and
Facebook, there are data aggregators and brokers, cutting-edge technologies
that often use proprietary trade secrets, and significant effort to convert raw
data to useful and saleable information.138 Taxing jurisdictions may not fully
131. See
U.S.
and
World
Population
Clock,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited May 25, 2021).
132. These exorbitant measures of tax may also violate the Commerce Clause. See infra Section
III.A.
133. “It would be ironic if the users of digital services were the ones who ultimately paid the
price for the harvesting of their own digital data.” Goulder, supra note 85, at 561.
134. H.B. 1303, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
135. The proposed bill explains its underlying motivations:
The legislature finds that there are various businesses engaged in accumulating the
personal data that is available to be collected on Washingtonians, aggregating or
compiling that information, and reselling it without any compensation to the people of
the state. This is a new business model that has flourished and is anticipated to grow as
more people and more devices are connected with ever-increasing frequency for an ever
greater number of innovative applications. As such, the legislature intends to have this
unique and growing industry set apart with its own individual tax rate. This will provide
transparency on the number of businesses and volume of activity in this industry, and
fairly generate revenue to be used for the benefit of the state of Washington and its people.
Id.
136. Id. Businesses engaged in personal data collection already pay tax under Washington’s
gross receipts tax regime, just at a lower rate and with less transparency.
137. See Business & Occupation Tax Classifications, WASH. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
https://dor.wa.gov/taxes-rates/business-occupation-tax/business-occupation-tax-classifications
(last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
138. See, e.g., Michael J. Semes, Maryland’s Proposed Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax
Should Not Be Enacted, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 4, 2021, 4:00 AM),
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understand these business models, which supports the assertion that current
tax regimes do not adequately tax data-focused industries but also cautions
against a hasty response. States and localities must be diligent in structuring
any new regime to tax sufficiently without killing an industry or harming
unintended participants, such as consumers in the jurisdiction. To that end,
Washington’s proposed bill incorporates information reporting
requirements.139 Although most businesses will disapprove because of the
additional compliance burden, Washington is at least ostensibly
incorporating the reporting requirement to learn more about the industry so
it can design an optimal tax regime and protect its residents.140
There are robust theoretical justifications for a data mining tax.141 In
addition, both national and subnational taxing jurisdictions have decades of
experience with natural resource extraction or severance taxes.142 Arguably,
extracting a valuable resource such as data falls within these same
constructs.143 Many coal severance taxes dedicate a portion of the imposition
to mine reclamation. Perhaps these data mining taxes could be characterized
as privacy reclamation charges. The United States Supreme Court has
decided constitutional challenges specific to severance taxes, although the
data mining taxes proposed above do not appear to impermissibly export the
tax burden out of state because the resource is generally used in the respective
state.144
Data mining taxes are gaining political traction and would effectively
impose tax on the value derived from collecting and monetizing user data.
Their primary drawback, depending on one’s perspective, is that because they
are so effective they are likely to disrupt the entire industry and could have
significant consequences.

https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report-state/marylands-proposed-digital-advertisinggross-revenues-tax-should-not-be-enacted; Goulder, supra note 85, at 559–60.
139. Reporting requirements often raise privacy and First Amendment concerns, but these
concerns are largely mitigated when the report is generic and does not include personal identifying
information.
140. See H.B. 1303, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
141. See Cui, supra note 1, at 71; Thimmesch, supra note 1, at 149; Zach Noble, User Data as
State Quasi Property: A Model for Taxing Platforms, 89 STATE TAX NOTES 777, 777–78 (2018).
142. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 4.18; Walter Hellerstein, Political Perspectives
of State and Local Taxation of Natural Resources, 19 GA. L. REV. 31, 32–35 (1984).
143. Goulder, supra note 85, at 559; Thimmesch, supra note 1, at 188 n.204. West Virginia’s
proposed data mining tax bill incorporates many aspects of natural resource severance taxes. See
H.B. 4898, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2020).
144. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 612 (1981).
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The approaches discussed in Part II face varying levels of constitutional
and federal preemption vulnerability. New tax regimes targeted at a very
specific subset of taxpayers are most suspect, particularly Maryland’s digital
advertising tax as currently conceived.145 All the potential approaches must
be analyzed within the constitutional limitations on state taxation, however,
as this Part discusses.
Despite genuine constitutional concerns, in practice it can be difficult to
invalidate a state tax statute on constitutional grounds. State and local tax
disputes must generally be litigated in the respective state’s court system
pursuant to the Tax Injunction Act.146 But state court judges may be less
comfortable analyzing federal constitutional issues, and most states’ tax trial
courts are administrative bodies, many of which do not have jurisdiction to
decide constitutional questions.147
Taxpayers frequently attempt to
circumvent the Tax Injunction Act, although these attempts are rarely
successful when addressing actual tax impositions.148
A. Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court established the analytical framework
for addressing dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state and local taxes
in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady.149 The four-prong Complete Auto test
provides that the tax must: (1) be applied to an activity that has a substantial
nexus with the jurisdiction; (2) be fairly apportioned to activities carried on
by the taxpayer in the jurisdiction; (3) not discriminate against interstate
commerce; and (4) be fairly related to services provided by the jurisdiction.150
Depending on their design, digital services taxes could violate some, none,
or all of the prongs.

145. The benefit for taxing jurisdictions of leading the subnational digital services tax movement
with the most suspect version possible is that if it is upheld as constitutional, essentially any of the
other approaches discussed herein would likely be upheld as constitutional as well.
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
147. See W. Scott Wright, Jonathan A. Feldman & Andrew D. Appleby, Courting Independence:
The Rise of Effective State Tax Courts and Tribunals, 63 STATE TAX NOTES 475, 476–77 (2012).
148. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 153 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875 (D.
Md. 2015) (holding that the dispute must be heard in state court because it was a tax and not a fee);
Complaint at 8, Chamber of Com. v. Franchot, Civ. No. 21-cv-410 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2021)
(asserting, in a complaint filed in federal court, that the Maryland digital advertising tax is not a tax
subject to the Tax Injunction Act but rather a punitive fee or assessment). Cf. Direct Mktg. Ass’n
v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1131 (2015) (holding that the Tax Injunction Act did not apply to a
reporting requirement because it was not the collection of tax).
149. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
150. Id.
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The substantial nexus prong has been the subject of considerable dispute
in the past. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc.151 reduces the likelihood of substantial nexus challenges.152 In
the context of digital services that involve collecting user data from residents
in the jurisdiction and then directly or indirectly facilitating advertisements
to those residents, there appears to be a significant enough connection with
the jurisdiction to constitute substantial nexus.153 The taxpayer arguably has
an economic presence in the jurisdiction and may even have a physical
presence if a state court were to adopt an expansive interpretation of that
concept.154 There are attenuated scenarios that could raise nexus concerns.
For example, a digital advertising broker that contracts with an advertising
customer and then places an advertisement with a digital service provider that
serves the advertisement throughout the country.155 The digital advertising
broker would have a very limited connection with any particular state.
Essentially all the digital tax proposals discussed thus far have
significant fair apportionment deficiencies, mainly because most proposals,
and even Maryland’s enacted bill, do not provide sourcing rules. Maryland’s
initial digital advertising tax proposal would have sourced digital advertising
gross receipts to Maryland if the user’s IP address was in Maryland or if there
was knowledge or reasonable suspicion that a user was using their device in
the state.156 This approach would have likely violated the internal
consistency test under the fair apportionment prong because it would have
often resulted in multiple taxation. For example, if both Maryland and New
York adopted this sourcing methodology, both states could tax a digital
advertiser’s gross receipts if the user’s device has an IP address that indicates
it is located in one of those states and the user is known or reasonably
suspected to be using that device in the other state. With digital advertising,
a user could be using their device in every state within the tax year.157
Maryland could have implemented a credit mechanism, as the New York data
mining tax proposal does. But instead, Maryland removed the sourcing
151. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
152. Id. at 2099.
153. Most state digital advertising tax proposals essentially incorporate a $1 million digital
advertising gross receipt economic nexus threshold through their reporting requirement provisions.
See, e.g., H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
154. See, e.g., U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. C339523 (Mass. App.
Tax Bd. Jan. 28, 2021) (granting summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer that challenged the
Massachusetts pre-Wayfair regulation that established web “cookies” as physical presence); Billy
Hamilton, Goodbye, Quill – One Way or the Other, 83 STATE TAX NOTES 379, 381–82 (2017).
155. See Cook & Stephanny, supra note 37.
156. S.B. 2, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020).
157. See, e.g., Complaint at 10–11, Apple Inc. v. City of Chicago, No. 2018L050514 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Cook Cnty. Aug. 27, 2018) (asserting that a digital tax sourcing regime is unconstitutional
because it taxes extraterritorial values).
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methodology entirely and inexplicably created an apportionment formula in
its place.158 It is unclear why an apportionment formula is necessary in this
gross receipts tax context. Determining the numerator of the formula, which
is Maryland digital advertising gross receipts, still requires a valid sourcing
methodology.159 Making matters worse, the statute uses the taxpayer’s digital
advertising gross receipts in the United States as a denominator. Although
the mechanics are unclear, it appears that the apportionment formula may
then be applied to the taxpayer’s worldwide digital advertising gross
receipts.160 If so, it is difficult to see how the apportionment methodology
satisfies either the internal or external consistency tests, although
straightforward amendments could cure the aforementioned deficiencies. 161
Even if Maryland remedies its sourcing issues with a coherent internally
and externally consistent sourcing methodology, taxpayers may assert that
the basis for the tax rate increases violates the external consistency test. First,
the tax rate increases are based on worldwide gross receipts, not Maryland
gross receipts.162 Second, the tax rate increases are based on gross receipts
from all activities, not just digital advertising gross receipts.163 Thus, a tax
rate four times higher may apply to taxpayers based on non-advertising
activities that have no connection with Maryland. Taxpayers have not found
great success, however, when asserting that a tax rate increase based on
extraterritorial income is unconstitutional.164 Several states, including
California and New York, impose higher personal income tax rates based on
the taxpayer’s federal taxable income rather than state taxable income.165
This approach has been sustained and arguably better reflects a taxpayer’s
ability to pay.166 As to external consistency specifically, when the Court first
158. The Maryland Comptroller’s proposed regulations implement a throw-out rule that removes
a device from both the numerator and denominator of the apportionment formula if its location is
indeterminate. 48:21 Md. Reg. 896 (Oct. 8, 2021).
159. See supra Section II.A.
160. It is actually unclear why there is an apportionment formula at all, as the assessable base
appears to be defined identically as the numerator of the apportionment formula.
161. Indeed, the Maryland Comptroller’s proposed regulations use devices in Maryland over
devices worldwide. 48:21 Md. Reg. 896 (Oct. 8, 2021). This apportionment formula remedies the
obvious extraterritorial taxation issue, but the proposed regulations conflict with the apportionment
formula in the statute itself.
162. H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
163. Id.
164. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 20.06[3] (“As we noted, courts have uniformly
rejected the contention that the states engage in extraterritorial taxation when they determine the
rate at which a nonresident pays tax by reference to all of the nonresident’s income, including
income beyond the state’s taxing power.”).
165. See id. ¶¶ 20.05[1][b], 20.06[3] (discussing Wheeler v. State, 249 A.2d 887 (Vt. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 4 (1969)).
166. Id. This ability to pay argument is less applicable, however, in a gross receipts tax regime
than in a net income tax regime.
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articulated the test it analyzed whether “income attributed to the State is in
fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to the business transacted . . . in that
State.’”167 In this case, assuming an appropriate sourcing methodology,
Maryland is taxing only Maryland source revenue. As initially conceived,
the external consistency test does not readily apply to determining tax rates
but applies only to apportionment, which is intuitive because it falls within
the fair apportionment prong.168 The anti-discrimination prong is more
pertinent for challenges to the progressive tax rate structure.
Indeed, the anti-discrimination prong is quite relevant to digital services
taxes. Digital services taxes arguably violate the anti-discrimination prong if
they have high gross receipts application thresholds because the taxes will
apply only to large national or international businesses and not to local
businesses. In effect, the tax will apply only to businesses engaged in
interstate commerce and not to businesses engaged solely in intrastate
commerce.169 In addition, graduated rate structures that impose a severe
notch effect exacerbate potential discrimination concerns.
Maryland’s digital advertising tax is particularly suspect. Because of
the tax’s high application threshold—over $100 million in global annual
gross receipts—it will apply primarily to large national or international
businesses and not to local Maryland-based businesses.170 In effect, the tax
will apply only to businesses engaged in interstate commerce and not to
businesses engaged solely in intrastate commerce. In addition, the tax’s rate
structure imposes a severe notch effect that imposes a vastly greater tax
burden on large international taxpayers than smaller local taxpayers. A
taxpayer with less than $1 billion in global annual gross receipts will pay a
2.5% tax on all their Maryland-sourced digital advertising receipts. A
taxpayer with greater than $15 billion in global annual gross receipts will pay
ten percent on all their Maryland-sourced digital advertising receipts. Thus,

167. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169–70 (1983) (emphasis
added) (quoting Hans Rees’ Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)).
168. The Court has articulated the external consistency test a bit more broadly, although the test
is still focused on apportionment: “External consistency . . . looks . . . to the economic justification
for the [s]tate’s claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a [s]tate’s tax reaches beyond that
portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing [s]tate.” Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (emphasis added).
169. This discrepancy does not inherently violate the anti-discrimination prong because all
taxpayers within a certain revenue band pay the same tax rate regardless of whether they operate
entirely intrastate or not. See, e.g., HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 4.14[3][t] (recognizing
that “taxes falling disproportionately on nonresidents may pass muster under the Commerce Clause
if they are imposed evenhandedly on residents and nonresidents, even if nonresidents engage in the
taxed activity more frequently than do residents”).
170. In addition, the gross receipt threshold is based on all the taxpayer’s gross receipts, not just
their digital advertising receipts.
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the effective tax rate for large interstate taxpayers is four times greater than
for smaller local taxpayers.
In contrast, New York’s data mining tax proposal is designed in a much
less discriminatory manner. The application threshold would be based on the
number of users, not gross receipts.171 The proposal begins to impose tax on
data collectors who collect personal data from at least one million New York
consumers in a given month. In the digital realm, even small, local datafocused companies can easily exceed that threshold. Crucially, the proposal
also incorporates a conventional progressive rate structure that eliminates a
severe notch effect. Every taxpayer would pay the exact same amount of tax,
for example, for collecting data on up to ten million New York consumers
during the tax period.172 The largest taxpayers would be subject to a higher
rate, but only on each New York consumer beyond each threshold. Thus,
taxpayers’ effective tax rates would be much closer under New York’s data
mining proposal than under Maryland’s digital advertising tax.
Depending on a digital service tax’s design, it may also violate the
fairly-related prong. Successful challenges under Complete Auto’s fourth
prong are rare.173 The United States Supreme Court does not look to the
“amount of the tax or the value of the benefits” provided.174 Rather, the Court
looks to whether “the measure of the tax [is] reasonably related to the extent
of the contact, since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State
that may properly be made to bear a ‘just share of state tax burden.’”175 This
framework incorporates the fundamental assumption that “the measure of a
tax is reasonably related to the taxpayer’s activities or presence in the
[s]tate—from which it derives some benefit such as the substantial privilege
of [doing business].”176
Although digital service providers derive significant economic benefit
from the jurisdiction in which the end user is located, the measure of tax may
be problematic. The Maryland digital advertising tax imposes a ten percent
gross receipt tax on the largest taxpayers, which is many magnitudes greater
than traditional gross receipt tax rates that are often one percent or less.177
171. S. 4959, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
172. For example, every taxpayer would pay the same $2.25 million in monthly tax for collecting
data on up to ten million New York consumers during the tax period. If larger companies collected
data on more than ten million New York consumers, the company would pay an additional tax of
$0.50 for each additional New York consumer.
173. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 4.18[2][d].
174. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625 (1981).
175. Id. at 626 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
176. Id. at 628–29 (emphasis added). The Court designed this standard in the context of general
taxes. Id. at 622–24. The purpose of the general taxes at issue were to provide “police and fire
protection and other advantages of civilized society.” Id. at 628.
177. Even Maryland’s lowest rate of 2.5% is more than double typical gross receipts tax rates.
See H.B. 732, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
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Washington’s data mining tax proposal, for example, would impose a flat
rate of 1.8% of gross receipts, which would be the highest rate in its regime.178
Although New York’s data mining tax is well designed in many ways, its
measure of tax leaves it susceptible to a Commerce Clause challenge as well.
The measure of New York’s tax is a monthly, per-user amount.179 The
highest marginal rate is $0.50 per New York user per month. This measure
of tax could far exceed the profit, or even gross revenue, that the taxpayer
generates in a particular month. In such a case, the exorbitant measure of tax
is arguably not fairly related to the benefit the taxpayer receives from
extracting data from users in the jurisdiction.
Taxpayers could also assert that each of the taxes discussed above
unduly burden interstate commerce under the reinvigorated Pike balancing
test.180 Although the Wayfair court suggested that the Pike balancing test
may play a larger role in dormant Commerce Clause challenges moving
forward, it has been traditionally eschewed in state and local tax
jurisprudence and diminished generally.181 In Pike, the Court established the
following balancing framework to analyze Commerce Clause challenges:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.182
As a threshold matter, some of the tax approaches—such as Maryland’s
digital advertising tax—may not regulate in an even-handed manner and may
have more than incidental effects on interstate commerce, as discussed
above.183 If a tax regime does satisfy those requirements, however, a court
would need to analyze potential local public interests. In addition to raising
revenue for essential underfunded state programs, each of the digital taxes
discussed in Part II arguably have the legitimate local purpose of accounting
for valuable data currently being extracted from users in their jurisdictions
178. See supra Section II.F.
179. S. 4959, 2021–2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
180. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
181. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein & Andrew Appleby, Substantive and Enforcement Jurisdiction
in a Post-Wayfair World, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 283, 292 (2018); Brannon P. Denning,
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 493–94
(2008).
182. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted).
183. See supra Section II.A.
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without direct payment or transparency. The resulting inquiry is then
twofold: whether the burdens imposed on taxpayers outweigh the respective
purpose; and, if not, whether the state’s purpose could be accomplished just
as well in a less burdensome manner.
In the context of digital services taxes, the most significant and realistic
burden relates to compliance. As discussed below, there are significant
administrative burdens related to determining the proper source of the receipt
in the digital context.184 These burdens are compounded when taxpayers
must comply with multiple digital taxes, whether within one jurisdiction or
across many. The cumulative compliance burdens could potentially
outweigh the local benefits—that argument is tenuous, however, especially
for large multinational businesses.185 In addition, depending on the digital
tax approach being analyzed, taxing jurisdictions may be able to accomplish
their stated purpose just as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce,
such as with other options discussed above.186 For example, Maryland could
expand its existing sales tax to include all advertising and to impose a higher
rate instead of creating a new digital advertising gross receipts tax regime.
Based on longstanding judicial reluctance to apply the inherently nuanced
Pike balancing framework in the tax context, especially in a state court, it
may be difficult for a taxpayer to succeed on this basis.
Digital services taxes also raise an unconventional Commerce Clause
argument: whether subnational digital services taxes violate the “one voice”
principle if the federal government is actively opposing international digital
services taxes.187 In such a case, if a subnational taxing jurisdiction were
allowed to impose a similar tax, it would severely undercut the federal
government’s power to speak with one voice against these taxes
internationally. The federal government could change course and reluctantly
permit international digital service taxes, even though it is unlikely to ever
embrace them.188 Such a policy shift would severely weaken the already
novel “one voice” argument against subnational digital services taxes.189
184. See infra Part IV.
185. One could also argue that these cumulative compliance burdens’ effect on interstate
commerce is beyond “incidental.” For example, if the world’s largest digital service providers were
to withdraw from the Maryland market because of the compliance burdens associated with the
digital advertising tax, there would be a significant effect on interstate commerce.
186. See supra Part II.
187. Mason, supra note 25.
188. The overwhelming target of these taxes are United States-based companies, so there is
political pressure to condemn these taxes. In addition, the United States is one of the only developed
nations without a federal consumption or transaction tax, so the United States does not currently
stand to benefit directly with its own digital services tax at the federal level.
189. See Mason, supra note 25. States that adopt approaches other than digital advertising taxes
could also assert that their tax regimes differ significantly from European-style digital services
taxes.
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B. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from making unreasonable
tax classifications, which is a fairly lenient standard for taxing
jurisdictions.190 The United States Supreme Court will generally analyze
whether “the State’s classification is ‘rationally related to the State’s
objective.’”191 If the taxing jurisdiction presents a reasonable justification,
the United States Supreme Court will generally sustain the tax even if it is
discriminatory.192 Although there is some mixed precedent, the United States
Supreme Court would likely uphold an Equal Protection Clause challenge of
a tax distinction based on a business’s number of locations or amount of gross
receipts.193 Thus, an equal protection argument based on a state imposing a
higher tax burden on digital advertisers with greater gross receipts than those
with fewer gross receipts is unlikely to be successful. An argument premised
on the digital distinction is more viable, but still doubtful. Digital advertisers
and traditional print or billboard advertisers are arguably not similarly
situated taxpayers and their business models vary significantly in crucial
ways. A state could present several colorable justifications for imposing a
higher tax burden on digital advertisers, notably the extraction and
monetization of user data, which would likely satisfy the lenient equal
protection standard.
With that said, state courts have been more likely than the United States
Supreme Court to find that taxes violate the state Equal Protection Clause.194
A state court may be more comfortable analyzing the state constitution rather
than the United States Constitution, which also allows the state court to
deviate from United States Supreme Court Equal Protection Clause
precedent.195 And, although some state courts may assert that the Uniformity
and Equal Protection Clause standards are essentially identical, it appears
taxpayers may have more success with state uniformity clause challenges.196
190. See U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 3.02. A state
imposing a higher rate of tax based on a taxpayer’s overall income or revenue would also likely
satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 20.06[3].
191. Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976)).
192. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1959).
193. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 3.03[5]–[6].
194. Id. ¶ 2.06[2]. “[S]ome state courts appear to be more sympathetic than the U.S. Supreme
Court to equal protection challenges to state tax classifications.” Id. ¶ 3.04[1].
195. State courts are bound by United States Supreme Court precedent while applying the United
States Constitution but are not so bound when applying the state’s constitution. Id. ¶ 3.04[1]. See
generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1195, 1195–97 (1985).
196. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 3.04[1][c]; Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 787
N.E.2d 786, 793 (Ill. 2003) (recognizing that “[t]he uniformity clause was intended to be a broader
limitation on legislative power to classify for nonproperty tax purposes than the limitation of the
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C. State Uniformity Clause
The most powerful constitutional restriction in certain states is uniform
taxation. Most state constitutions include some type of tax uniformity
clause.197 These uniformity clauses vary considerably across the states, and
many apply only to property taxes.198 State courts tend to interpret uniformity
clauses broadly, and although taxpayers may also raise State and Federal
Equal Protection Clause challenges, taxpayers are more likely to be
successful with a state uniformity clause challenge to these digital taxes.199
The overarching uniformity and equal protection inquiries are whether the
taxing jurisdiction properly determined each taxpayer class, and whether it
applies the tax uniformly across that class.200
Most relevant to the digital taxes discussed above, it is unclear whether
a taxing jurisdiction can justify disparate tax treatment based on taxpayer size
without violating the state constitution’s uniformity clause.201 Both Georgia
and Pennsylvania, which have broad uniformity provisions that apply beyond
property taxes, have addressed the issue.202 The Georgia Supreme Court held
that a business license tax violated the state constitution’s uniformity
provision because the tax imposed a greater flat charge if a business reached
a certain employee threshold.203 The court did, however, recognize that a
reasonable justification for a size-based class is that larger businesses have
greater ability to pay and produce greater regulatory costs for the locality.204
Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck

equal protection clause” (citing Searle Pharms., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 512 N.E.2d 1240 (Ill.
1987))).
197. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 2.01. Neither New York nor Connecticut have
constitutional tax uniformity provisions. Id.
198. Id. ¶¶ 2.01, 2.06. Importantly, some courts have characterized net income taxes as a type
of property tax. See Kunath v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 1235, 1239 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 1 2019)
(citing Culliton v. Chase, 25 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1933)).
199. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 3.04[1][c].
200. Id. ¶ 2.06; Arangold Corp., 787 N.E.2d at 793.
201. The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion to the New Hampshire
legislature concluding that imposing different property tax rates based on taxpayer size would
violate the state’s uniformity clause unless there was a “valid reason” justifying the disparate
treatment. Op. of the Justs., 386 A.2d 1273, 1275 (N.H. 1978).
202. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, ¶ III; PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. These broad provisions require
that taxes be imposed uniformly upon the same class of subjects rather than property.
203. Pharr Road Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 S.E.2d 333, 335–36 (Ga. 1968). The court
suggested that a tax that imposed a certain rate per employee up to a threshold, and then a higher
amount per employee that exceeds that threshold, would pass muster. Id.; see also Ping v. City of
Cortez, 342 P.2d 657, 659 (Colo. 1959) (holding that a uniform per-employee business license tax
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
204. Pharr Road Inv. Co., 162 S.E.2d at 335.
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down business license taxes because the provisions exempted taxpayers that
had gross receipts below a certain threshold.205
With digital taxes that draw harsh distinctions and impose a severe notch
effect on taxpayers that have greater gross receipts, taxpayers may have a
viable uniformity argument. Taxpayers could also base a uniformity
challenge on the digital versus traditional distinction, as discussed in Section
III.B, for equal protection purposes. Although these are cogent arguments, a
state court could easily deem these classifications to be reasonable.
Regardless, most states do not have broad uniformity provisions that apply
to all tax types.206 Thus, the digital tax approaches that are most vulnerable
to a uniformity challenge are stock-based taxes and data ad valorem taxes
because they could fall within the scope of most state constitutional
uniformity clauses.
D. First Amendment
The First Amendment prohibits taxes that discriminate against the press
or impermissibly restrain free speech.207 A recent dispute in Maryland
regarding Baltimore’s billboard excise tax is instructive for digital tax
proposals.208 The Maryland Court of Appeals determined that the First
Amendment was not implicated because the billboard provider was being
taxed on providing the medium for speech but was not being taxed on its
speech, and that the tax did not regulate or ban speech and was content
neutral.209 The appellate court then stated that, even if the First Amendment
was implicated, the tax was permissible.210 The court analyzed the relevant
United States Supreme Court precedent in this area and concluded that “[t]o
be struck down on First Amendment grounds, a tax must, therefore, threaten
‘to suppress the expression of particular ideas or viewpoints,’ target ‘a small
group of speakers,’ or discriminate ‘on the basis of the content of taxpayer
speech.’”211 The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed, holding that heightened
205. Id. at 336; Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 196 A.2d 664, 666–67 (Pa. 1964); cf. City &
Cnty. of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d 339, 344 (Colo. 1969) (en banc)
(determining that under the Equal Protection Clause a similar exemption “is not arbitrary and is
reasonable”).
206. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 2.01.
207. See id. ¶ 13.11[4].
208. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Dir., Dep’t of Fin., 244 Md. App. 304, 223 A.3d 1050 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2020), cert. granted, 468 Md. 543, 228 A.3d 163 (2020), aff’d, 472 Md. 444, 247
A.3d 740 (2021).
209. Id. at 317, 223 A.3d at 1058.
210. Id. at 317–18, 223 A.3d at 1058.
211. Id. at 322, 223 A.3d at 1060 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)). But
cf. City of Baltimore v. A.S. Abell Co., 218 Md. 273, 288–89, 145 A.2d 111, 119 (1958) (holding
that municipal taxes on advertising media were unconstitutional for singling out newspapers and
radio and television stations for taxation).
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scrutiny under the First Amendment applies only “when a tax suppresses or
threatens to suppress particular ideas or viewpoints by (1) singling out the
press, (2) targeting a small group of speakers, or (3) discriminating on the
basis of the content of taxpayer speech.”212
Digital tax opponents will likely assert a First Amendment challenge,
although courts may be reluctant to invalidate most digital tax proposals on
these grounds. None of the digital tax approaches discussed above
overwhelmingly violate any of the three bases to invalidate a tax on the press
on First Amendment grounds, and Maryland’s exemption for broadcast and
news media entities weakens a First Amendment challenge.213
E. Internet Tax Freedom Act
Federal preemption may be the most likely barrier for digital services
taxes, specifically preemption based on ITFA.214 ITFA contains two
operative provisions. The first prohibits states and localities from imposing
any tax on “Internet access.”215 This operative provision is important because
it was a primary justification for Congress making ITFA permanent and it
may preclude any ITFA repeal efforts, as discussed below. Although this
provision may not initially appear to impact most digital services tax
proposals, some digital services taxes could potentially fall within this
operative provision because ITFA defines “Internet access” much more
broadly than its commonly understood definition.216
212. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Dir., Dep’t of Fin., 472 Md. 444, 477–78, 247 A.3d 740,
759–60 (2021). But see Lamar Advantage GP Co., L.L.C. v. City of Cincinnati, No. 2021-Ohio3155, 2021 WL 4201656, at *19–20 (Ohio Sept. 16, 2021) (holding that a billboard tax violated the
First Amendment and stating that the reasoning in Clear Channel Outdoor was not persuasive).
213. The Maryland legislature amended its digital advertising tax to exempt advertising hosted
by broadcast or news media entities, although not necessarily to preempt a First Amendment
challenge. S.B. 787, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2021).
214. Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–719
(creating 47 U.S.C. § 151 note, ITFA §§ 1100–09); Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 922, 130 Stat. 122 (2016) (making ITFA permanent). Pursuant to
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2, the laws of the United
States are the supreme law of the country. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
215. ITFA § 1101(a)(1).
216. ITFA defines “Internet access” to include “a homepage, electronic mail and instant
messaging (including voice- and video-capable electronic mail and instant messaging), video clips,
and personal electronic storage capacity, that are provided independently or not packaged with
Internet access.” Id. § 1105(5)(E). But “Internet access” does not include “voice, audio or video
programming.” Id. § 1105(5)(D). Apple is asserting that Chicago’s streaming video tax violates
ITFA because it imposes tax on video clips, which fall under ITFA’s definition of “Internet access.”
Complaint, supra note 157, at 4, 8, 14–15. In separate litigation, Apple is also asserting that Texas
cannot impose tax on its iCloud storage service because it qualifies as “personal electronic storage
capacity” under ITFA. Complaint at 1, 5, Apple Inc. v. Hegar, No. D-1-GN-20-004108 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Travis Cnty. Aug. 7, 2020). Both cases focus on the confusing statutory language that considers
these services to be protected “Internet access” even if not packaged with “Internet access.” Another
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ITFA’s second operative provision prohibits states and localities from
imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.217 This
provision’s broad language may prohibit digital-specific state and local tax
proposals. ITFA defines “[e]lectronic commerce” as “any transaction
conducted over the Internet or through Internet access, comprising the sale,
lease, license, offer, or delivery of property, goods, services, or information,
whether or not for consideration, and includes the provision of Internet
access.”218 And ITFA defines “tax” broadly as “any charge imposed by any
governmental entity for the purpose of generating revenues for governmental
purposes, and . . . not a fee imposed for a specific privilege, service, or
benefit conferred” or a sales and use tax collection obligation.219
ITFA’s “discriminatory tax” definition includes several alternatives,
although the most applicable is any state or local tax imposed on “electronic
commerce” that is not imposed, or is imposed at a lower rate, on “transactions
involving similar property, goods, services, or information accomplished
through other means.”220 A tax on “electronic commerce” is also
discriminatory if it “imposes an obligation to collect or pay the tax on a
different person or entity than in the case of transactions involving similar
property, goods, services, or information accomplished through other
means.”221
There are few cases interpreting ITFA’s anti-discrimination provision.
If a state were to impose a tax on a provider’s digital advertising receipts but
not on a provider’s non-digital advertising receipts—as is the case with
Maryland’s digital advertising tax—at first glance it seems clear the tax
would discriminate against electronic commerce. The same analysis applies
to a sales tax imposed on digital advertising but not print advertising. A
jurisdiction could assert, however, that digital advertising is not “similar” to
non-digital advertising.222 Although both accomplish the same end result,
potential complication stemming from ITFA’s imprecise drafting is that ITFA preemption applies
to an “Internet [A]ccess [P]rovider” only if it offers screening software to protect minors. See, e.g.,
New Cingular Wireless PCS LLC v. Comm’r of Revenue, 154 N.E.3d 947, 955 (Mass. App. Ct.
2020).
217. ITFA § 1101(a)(2).
218. Id. § 1105(3).
219. Id. § 1105(8)(A).
220. Id. § 1105(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
221. Id. § 1105(2)(A)(iii).
222. See, e.g., Labell v. City of Chicago, 147 N.E.3d 732, 747 (Ill. App. 1st 2019), appeal denied,
144 N.E.3d 1175 (Ill. 2020) (holding that streaming services are not “similar” to live performances
for ITFA, and suggesting that ITFA applies only when the services are “identical”); Gartner, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue, 455 P.3d 1179, 1193 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 2 2020) (holding that an online
research library is not “equivalent” to research delivered via CD or email for ITFA purposes);
Darien Shanske, Christopher Moran & David Gamage Maryland’s Digital Tax and the ITFA’s
Catch-22, 100 TAX NOTES STATE 141, 142–43 (2021); Dan R. Bucks et al., The Maryland and New
York Approaches to Taxing the Data Economy, 100 TAX NOTES STATE 147, 148–49 (2021).

38

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1

they do so in very different ways. Digital advertising relies heavily on
extracting user data, using advanced analytics to process that data into useful
information, and then serving the targeted advertisements through a free or
subsidized digital service.223 Traditional advertising incorporates some
rudimentary versions of these processes, but printing a static graphic on a
billboard is arguably dissimilar from serving a targeted video advertisement
on a user’s Facebook feed or Google search result webpage. In addition, nonelectronic advertising may soon cease to exist in a meaningful way.224 This
progression advances the argument that there are not similar non-electronic
services and also allows jurisdictions to define the scope of their taxes
broadly to include all advertising or all data extraction, regardless of
electronic or non-electronic, because of the minor impact on non-electronic
service providers in those industries.225
ITFA’s “multiple tax” definition is also quite broad:
[A]ny tax that is imposed by one State or political subdivision
thereof on the same or essentially the same electronic commerce
that is also subject to another tax imposed by another State or
political subdivision thereof (whether or not at the same rate or on
the same basis), without a credit . . . for taxes paid in other
jurisdictions.226
A congressional report provided an example of the intent underlying the
multiple tax provision:
[A] resident of Virginia downloads a movie from a company based
in Seattle while waiting at the airport in Chicago. Three states
could claim the right to tax it; Virginia, Washington and Illinois.
The statute . . . requires credits so the customer is not subject to
three separate tax levies.227
Any digital services tax proposal must incorporate a sourcing regime that
avoids ITFA’s multiple tax prohibition, as discussed in greater detail
below.228
223. See, e.g., supra note 2.
224. Many billboards are now electronic video boards that may fall within the scope of digital
advertising taxes. Print newspaper circulation has dwindled dramatically, and telephone directories
such as the Yellow Pages have gone from a preeminent advertising tool to a historical afterthought.
225. The tax impact is mitigated further with progressive rates, as smaller traditional advertising
businesses would be subject to much lower rates than the world’s largest technology companies.
226. ITFA § 1105(6)(A). ITFA provides an exception to the “multiple tax” definition that could
be construed to exempt all sales and use taxes from the definition. Id. § 1105(6)(B). The purpose
of this exception, however, was much different and such an interpretation would contradict
legislative history and undermine the provision substantially. This exception originally addressed
grandfathered taxes on Internet access, which are no longer applicable, so the cross-reference was
deleted, which resulted in this ambiguous and potentially misleading language.
227. H.R. REP. NO. 113-510, at 3 (2014).
228. See infra Part IV.
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Despite ITFA’s broad language, there are several scenarios that may
circumvent preemption. First, a jurisdiction could design its digital services
tax in a manner that complies with ITFA, as discussed in this Section, or
impose a non-digital-specific tax such as the corporate income tax surcharge
or stock-based taxes discussed above.229 Second, a federal, rather than
subnational, digital services tax would not be preempted. Third, even if a
subnational digital services tax appeared to violate ITFA, state courts may be
hesitant to preempt the tax for several reasons. State courts and
administrative tribunals may be reluctant to address federal preemption
generally and may strive to decide a case on state statutory grounds instead.230
State courts may interpret ITFA’s preemption very narrowly despite its broad
language,231 or simply misinterpret ITFA’s technically complex and
imprecisely drafted provisions, in favor of the taxing jurisdiction.232 And
United States Supreme Court precedent imposes a presumption against
federal preemption, basing the analysis on congressional intent.233 A state
court could determine that Congress’s original intent, discussed below, was
not to preempt taxes on substantial revenue derived from extracting user data,
which may have been nominal or unforeseeable in 1998 or even 2014.
Finally, even if a state court invalidated a subnational digital services
tax based on ITFA preemption, Congress could reasonably repeal at least
ITFA’s electronic commerce provision.234 When Congress was deciding
whether to make ITFA permanent, the House Judiciary Committee provided
valuable insight into the original intent of ITFA and why at least some aspects
of ITFA were no longer appropriate.235

229. See supra Sections II.C, II.D.
230. See, e.g., In re Expedia, Inc., DTA Nos. 825025 and 825026, at 19 (N.Y.S. Div. Tax App.
Feb. 5, 2015) (finding in favor of the taxpayer on a state statutory basis and declining to address the
taxpayer’s ITFA discrimination argument).
231. See supra note 222. State courts are even less likely than federal courts to strike down their
own state’s tax regime, colloquially deemed the “home cooking” doctrine. See Hellerstein &
Appleby, supra note 181, at 292. Digital advertising tax opponents recognize this difficulty and are
attempting to challenge these taxes in federal court despite the Tax Injunction Act. See Complaint
at 4, Chamber of Com. v. Franchot, Civ. No. 21-cv-410 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 2021).
232. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. StubHub!, Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010)
(misinterpreting ITFA’s multiple tax provision in favor of the state taxing authority).
233. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334–35 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). The Illinois Supreme Court held that
ITFA preempted the state’s “click-through” nexus law, although a well-reasoned dissent presented
a strong case against preemption. Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Ill.
2013).
234. Recently, scholars asserted that ITFA should be repealed in its entirety and that there may
be political viability to do so. See, e.g., Dan R. Bucks et al., Is It Time to Tax the Digital Economy?,
99 TAX NOTES STATE 29, 31, 33 (2021).
235. H.R. REP. NO. 113-510, at 5–10 (2014).
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ITFA’s first operative provision, which prohibits taxes on Internet
access, is perhaps more important today than in 1998. Congress described
the Internet as “the greatest gateway to knowledge and self-help that has ever
existed.”236 Removing barriers to Internet access, particularly making it more
affordable by exempting it from taxation, serves many governmental goals,
including mitigating income inequality. Although states are permitted to tax
other fundamental services such as electricity and telephone, it appears
unlikely that Congress would repeal ITFA’s prohibition on Internet access
taxes in the near future.
ITFA’s second operative provision, however, is no longer achieving its
intended purpose. The original intent of this discriminatory or multiple tax
prohibition was to “foster the growth of electronic commerce.”237 That
Congress included a sunset provision in the original ITFA, and then only
extended ITFA reluctantly several times until finally making it permanent in
2014, reflects ITFA’s intended temporary nature.238 ITFA was intended to
incubate electronic commerce, not to provide an enduring advantage over
traditional commerce.239 In 2014, members of Congress opposed making
ITFA permanent because “[t]he Internet is no longer a nascent development
in need of Federal tax protection to grow. It is now a prosperous sector of
the global economy.”240 Congress recognized that by 2014, “one of the
original goals of the ITFA—to foster electronic commerce by protecting it
from multiple and discriminatory taxation—has already been met as
evidenced by the explosion of commercial transactions over the Internet.”241
The veracity of that sentiment has strengthened since 2014, as electronic
commerce has continued its exponential growth. Congress recognized that
ITFA’s “economic commerce” provision “will restrain the states’ ability to
cope with economic downturns” and “will burden taxpayers while excluding
an entire industry from paying their fair share of taxes.”242 These statements
proved prescient and undergird the current digital services tax movement. In
addition, states may assert that ITFA violates the Tenth Amendment because
it unconstitutionally restrains states’ rights.243 Repealing ITFA’s “electronic
commerce” provision would be a logical response and would allow
subnational jurisdictions the flexibility to respond to a rapidly evolving
economy.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 2–3.
See id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19.
See Shanske et al., supra note 222, at 144.
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IV. SOURCING CHALLENGES
The most challenging aspect of any digital tax is determining the source
of the receipt, transaction, or property, especially considering the
constitutional limitations discussed in Part III. Even with most jurisdictions
adopting a market-based, destination sourcing approach for most tax types,
tax statutes must precisely define the “destination” for purposes of the
specific tax.244 In the traditional retail economy, a customer would physically
visit a retailer and purchase tangible personal property. Sourcing that
transaction to the location where the physical transaction occurred was fairly
easy. Sourcing digital transactions is much more difficult, especially when
analyzing complex business models beyond simple retail sales.
If no physical product is delivered, states generally look to where the
benefit of the service was received.245 Determining that location will vary
with each type of service, although none are straightforward. With a digital
content streaming service, the benefit is received where the customer
consumes the content. But that customer may pay a monthly subscription fee
and consume the content on a mobile device in multiple jurisdictions during
that month. Using a proxy such as a billing address is imprecise and allows
for customers to manipulate their address to minimize or avoid tax. Using
billing addresses may be acceptable at the state level given lack of
alternatives and the large percentage of consumption that occurs within a
customer’s home state, but it is more problematic at the local level. Using
the customer’s IP address is much more precise but imposes an enormous
compliance burden on the service provider and consumers can easily
manipulate their IP address. Even if the service provider tracked the IP
address of each device streaming content on each account, the service
provider would then need to allocate a portion of the monthly charge to each

244. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 9.18[3], 18.05. Although unconventional, some
jurisdictions may prefer an origination sourcing method if the large digital service providers have
an inordinate presence in that particular jurisdiction. Determining where the service is being
performed, however, is also challenging. Even if a large digital service provider is headquartered
in a particular locality, the service is generally provided through an integrated global enterprise, so
it is inappropriate to source all receipts to the headquarters location. Further, an origination sourcing
methodology makes the jurisdiction less attractive to businesses because the business’s tax liability
increases when its presence in the jurisdiction increases, which is why most jurisdictions have
shifted to market sourcing. Regardless, it would not be a complete surprise to see a West Coast
locality attempt this sourcing approach. See Appleby, supra note 50, at 480–81 (discussing local
taxes measured by a taxpayer’s employees or receipts in that locality). In addition, an origination
approach for a consumption tax is inappropriate because the transaction should be sourced to where
the consumption occurred. See, e.g., Mazur & Thimmesch, supra note 75, at 964.
245. See, e.g., STREAMLINED SALES TAX GOVERNING BD., INC., STREAMLINED SALES AND USE
TAX
AGREEMENT
(SSUTA)
§§ 310.A,
311.B
(2020),
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/docs/default-source/agreement/ssuta/ssuta-as-amendedthrough-12-18-20.pdf?sfvrsn=4b26a714_8.
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relevant jurisdiction, which could be hundreds or even thousands of
jurisdictions per month per customer.
Sourcing digital advertising receipts is even more difficult. The
advertising customer, the business that pays for the advertising service,
receives the benefit of the advertisement everywhere that it is observed by
potential customers. Digital advertisements often have a global reach so the
benefit may be received in hundreds of jurisdictions. This analysis shifts
from focusing on the customer to the customer’s potential customers, often
called a look-through approach.246 The attenuated nature of the inquiry
presents many practical difficulties. The digital advertising service provider
may be able to track audience location based on IP address, either viewing or
clicking through, but that is a difficult and still imprecise measure. In the
corporate income tax context, many state tax authorities have at least
informally allowed audience sourcing, using population as a proxy.247 For
example, if a digital advertisement was delivered only within the United
States, and California accounted for ten percent of the United States
population, then ten percent of the digital advertising receipts would be
sourced to California. This approach sacrifices accuracy for administrative
ease.248 One could argue that this approach is so inaccurate that it would fail
constitutional scrutiny. A taxing jurisdiction could attempt to mitigate the
compliance burden by allowing taxpayers two alternative sourcing options,
which was Maryland’s initial proposed digital advertising tax approach.249

246. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶ 10.07; see, e.g., MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N,
MODEL GEN. ALLOCATION AND APPORTIONMENT REG. IV.17(d)(3)(B)3.a (2017),
https://www.mtc.gov/Uniformity/Project-Teams/Section-17-Model-Market-Sourcing-Regulations
(noting that for corporate income tax purposes, “in the case of the direct or indirect delivery of
advertising on behalf of a customer to the customer’s intended audience by electronic means, the
service is delivered in [state] to the extent that the audience for the advertising is in [state]”); id. at
IV.17(d)(3)(B)3.d Example iii (explaining Internet advertising is assigned to the state “to the extent
that the viewers of the Internet content are in [state], as measured by viewings or clicks”); N.Y. TAX
LAW § 210-A.8(c) (McKinney 2019) (adopting audience-based sourcing for advertisers for
corporate income tax); Advisory Op., TSB-A-09(5)C (2009), 2009 WL 799456, at *1–2 (N.Y. Dept.
of Tax’n & Fin. 2009) (addressing audience-based sourcing specifically in the context of Internet
advertising).
247. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 10.05, 10.04.
248. In an ideal world, states would agree on a simple uniform sourcing methodology such as
sourcing all digital advertising tax revenues based on market share or population.
249. Maryland’s initial proposed digital advertising tax bill established the following sourcing
methodology: (1) a user’s IP address; or (2) the knowledge or reasonable suspicion that a user is
using their device in the state. S.B. 2, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020). Many opponents
pointed out the likely unconstitutional nature of this proposed methodology, so the enacted bill
simply eliminated any sourcing methodology and delegated to the taxing authority the responsibility
to establish a viable sourcing methodology, presumably by promulgating a formal regulation. See,
e.g., Charlie Kearns & Charles Capouet, Why Md.’s Digital Advertising Tax Proposal May Be
Unlawful, LAW360 (Jan. 15, 2020, 5:52 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1234069/why-mds-digital-advertising-tax-proposal-may-be-unlawful.
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For example, the sourcing rule could default to end user IP address but allow
for another reasonable method if the IP address method is impractical.250
This approach, however, may violate the Commerce Clause, as discussed in
Section III.A.
Novel proposals such as a data ad valorem tax or data mining tax present
additional sourcing considerations. These taxes should arguably use a
sourcing methodology based on the location of the end user from whom the
taxpayer extracted the data. The actual value of the data is realized, however,
only when sold directly or through advertising. Thus, there is an argument
that these taxes should be sourced to the advertising customer’s location, and
if using an audience-based method to do so, would look to the end user
location. In the case of targeted advertising, the result may effectively be the
same because data is extracted from a user and then used to deliver targeted
advertising back to them.
Although determining how to source digital services is difficult, it is
necessary given the shift toward a digital economy. Indeed, many states
began updating their sales tax regimes over a decade ago to tax digital goods
and services and have reached workable sourcing rules, even if they are not
ideal.251 The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) adopts a
standard sourcing approach for tangible personal property and digital
goods.252 There are cascading sourcing rules that generally source
transactions “to the location where the purchaser takes possession or first
makes use of digital goods.”253 Although the SSUTA sourcing rules may not
be perfect, at least SSUTA promotes uniformity, which would aid greatly as
jurisdictions expand further into digital taxation.254 Although unlikely, the
importance of sourcing for digital services could also result in federal
legislation. In 2019, a proposed federal bill would have established a
mandatory sourcing methodology for digital goods and services.255 Thus far,
250. The Maryland Comptroller’s proposed regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of five
technologies that may be used to determine a device’s location and requires the taxpayer to use
“information within their possession or control which most reliably identifies a device’s location.”
48:21 Md. Reg. 896 (Oct. 8, 2021). This ambiguous standard will likely result in controversy, as
will the proposed regulation’s throw-out rule for devices with an “indeterminate” location. See,
e.g., Ulrik Boesen & Jared Walczak, Three Issues with Proposed Regulations for Maryland’s
Digital Advertising Tax, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 9, 2021), https://taxfoundation.org/maryland-digitaladvertising-tax-regulations/.
251. See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 83, ¶¶ 13.06, 13.07.
252. See SSUTA, supra note 245, § 309.A.
253. Mazur & Thimmesch, supra note 75, at 965; see also SSUTA, supra note 245, §§ 310.A,
311.B.
254. See Mazur & Thimmesch, supra note 75, at 966–67.
255. See Digital Goods and Services Tax Fairness Act of 2019, H.R. 1725, 116th Cong. (2019).
A more extreme federal preemptory approach could establish much more straightforward, but less
precise, sourcing rules. For example, a federal statute could mirror the Nonadmitted and
Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 and provide that only a customer’s home state, based either on
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there has been substantial uniformity with states’ digital advertising bills,
although most fail to address the difficult but crucial sourcing issue. States
should work diligently, with one another and the business community, to
develop thoughtful sourcing rules instead of delegating that crucial function
to the taxing authority.
CONCLUSION
Although subnational taxing jurisdictions face many challenges in their
pursuit of adequate digital service taxation, certain approaches are more
viable than others. States have favored digital advertising taxes, but these
taxes are narrow and susceptible to challenge.
Jurisdictions can modify existing tax regimes to more adequately
address digital services. Jurisdictions can expand their existing sales and use
tax regimes to include services, particularly digital services, to the furthest
extent possible. This expansion is long overdue and would allow antiquated
state and local transaction tax regimes to more appropriately address the shift
toward a service-based, and increasingly digital-service-based, economy.
Alternatively, states can impose a corporate net income tax surcharge tailored
toward certain corporations that may not be taxed adequately under the
existing regime because of the corporations’ dynamic business models.
If jurisdictions have the foresight and political will to embrace a novel
tax regime, there are several compelling options. An annual tax on the market
value of publicly traded stock represents a simple approach that would
generate substantial revenue and accomplish jurisdictions’ goals of taxing
large corporations that arguably have excess profits and market valuation,
including the largest digital advertisers and many other companies that profit
from user data. A data ad valorem tax would directly tax the value of user
data, although determining the valuation is difficult and many states have
constitutional property tax restrictions, particularly for intangible property.
This Article suggests that a data mining tax is the most effective
approach if a jurisdiction is attempting to tax the value derived from
extracting and monetizing user data. Rather than using a proxy for this value,
such as digital advertising, a data mining tax has the most direct connection
to the value corporations derive from user data. Although there are still
valuation questions, there are many fewer constitutional and practical
concerns than with other options. Because a data mining tax has such
immense potential to raise revenue and effectively target the value derived
from these activities, taxing jurisdictions must be mindful of shifting the tax
domicile or principal place of business, could impose tax on a digital good or service transaction.
See 15 U.S.C. § 8201(a). This rule could be extended to digital advertising and data mining taxes
using a look-through approach discussed above. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
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incidence to consumers or employees and of other potential repercussions. If
subnational jurisdictions craft data mining taxes carefully and thoughtfully,
the resulting tax regimes will provide a national and international blueprint
for effectively taxing the digital service economy.

